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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
DUTCH NATIONALISM AND THE QUESTION OF FOREIGNERS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
 
Gökhan Üzüm 
 
 
M.A. in European Studies Programme, Thesis, 2007 
 
 
Dissertation Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. E. Burak Arıkan                
 
 
 
Key Words: public preferences, public opinion polls, xenophobia, immigration policy, 
extreme right-wing parties, civic nationalism, pillar system. 
 
 
It is argued in classical political science that policy outputs are fed by public preferences 
(inputs). It is also argued that these inputs more resonate in Western democracies. For that 
reason, policy outputs in democratic countries are expected to reflect public preferences. At 
this point, it is important to know how to measure and how to reach these preferences and 
clear result of this process is public opinion polls. In that sense, it is discussed that in spite of 
the fact that the credibility of public opinion polls is a bit controversial, they still measure and 
reflect public preferences. In this context, according to the eurobarometer survey results, 
although Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average, these xenophobic sentiments 
that constitute public inputs do not turn into policy outputs in the Netherlands. Therefore, in 
 v
the Dutch case, policy outputs and public inputs differ from each other.  Indeed, integrative 
immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition are clear proof of this situation in 
the country. However, why classical input-output correlation does not work in the 
Netherlands? According to the findings of this study, civic nationalism and the pillar system 
prevent public inputs in transforming into policy outputs.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
HOLLANDA MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ VE HOLLANDA’DA YABANCILAR SORUNU  
 
 
Gökhan ÜZÜM 
 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2007 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. E. Burak Arıkan                
 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: kamu tercihleri, kamu yoklamaları, yabancı düşmanlığı, göçmen 
politikası, aşırı sağ partiler, yurttaş milliyetçiliği, sütun sistemi. 
 
 
Klasik siyaset biliminde politika çıktılarının kamu tercihleriyle (girdi) beslendiği iddia 
edilir. Bu girdilerin Batı demokrasilerinde daha çok yankı buldukları da belirtilir. Bu nedenle, 
demokratik ülkelerdeki politika çıktılarının kamu tercihlerini yansıtmaları beklenir. Bu 
noktada, bu tercihlerin nasıl ölçüleceğini ve bunlara nasıl ulaşacılağını bilmek önem arz 
etmektedir ve bu sürecin doğal bir sonucu kamuoyu yoklamalarıdır. Bu anlamda, kamuoyu 
yoklamalarının güvenilirliği her ne kadar biraz tartışmalı da olsa, bu yoklamaların hala belirli 
bir kamu tercihini yansıttığı savunulur. Bu bağlamda, eurobarometer anket sonuçlarına göre 
her ne kadar Hollanda toplumu Avrupa ortalaması kadar yabancı düşmanı çıksa da, birer 
kamu girdisi anlamına gelen bu yabancı düşmanı duygular Hollanda’da politika çıktılarına 
 vii
dönüşmemekteler. Bu nedenle, Hollanda örneğinde politika çıktıları ve kamu girdileri 
birbirlerinden farklılık gösterebiliyor. Gerçekten de, entegrasyoncu göçmen politikası ve 
güçsüz aşırı sağ parti geleneği ülkedeki bu durumun açık bir kanıtıdır. Fakat, neden klasik 
girdi-çıktı korelasyonu Hollanda’da gerçekleşmiyor? Bu çalışmanın bulgularına göre, 
yurttaşlık milliyetçiliği (civic nationalism) ve sütun sistemi (pillar system) kamu girdilerinin 
politika çıktılarına dönüşümünü engelliyor. 
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Introduction 
 
The Netherlands has long been a country of different religious groups. Indeed, 
Catholic and Protestant segmentation of society has been clear for years and years. On 
the other hand, thanks to the immigrants and guest workers, ethnic differences also 
became one of the distinguishing features of the Netherlands in the middle of the 
twentieth century. Moreover, not only ethnic differences but also religious diversities, 
especially with the introduction of Islam into the country, have increased after this 
immigration influx. Nevertheless, it has been relatively successful in harboring many 
different cultures inside the country. Indeed, in comparison to their counterparts, for a 
long time immigrants in the Netherlands enjoyed liberal rights granted to them and lived 
freely in the country. 
On the other hand, during the 2002 Dutch national election campaign, politician 
Pim Fortuyn who is famous with his anti-Islamic discourse was murdered by an animal 
rights activist on the ground that he was seen as a growing danger who would affect 
liberal tendency towards immigrants in society. Worse than this, in 2004, when director 
Theo Van Gogh, a well-known critic of Islam, made his movie “Submission” in which 
he filmed Qur'anic verses painted on women's naked bodies and dealt with violence 
against women in Islamic societies, he was shot to death by a Moroccan Dutch citizen 
in Amsterdam. Later on, we all witnessed the retaliation bombing of Muslim schools in 
the country. Furthermore, in 2005, Law on the Integration of Newcomers was approved 
by Parliament. The new law brings certain requirements for those who apply for 
permanent residence in the Netherlands. In that sense, once their applications are 
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accepted they are required to have basic knowledge of Dutch language, institutions, 
history or culture before their arrival to the Netherlands. Similar requirements are also 
assigned to those who stay in the country for a long time but have little knowledge of 
the Dutch or the Netherlands as newcomers. 
In that sense, the aforementioned developments that occurred in the 2000s seem to 
interrupt the cohabitation appearance in the Netherlands and all these developments 
sparked a debacle on the content of foreigners around xenophobia in the country. 
Indeed, eurobarometer1 survey results show that the Netherlands is quite xenophobic as 
much as its counterparts. Accordingly, sometimes very close to European average and 
sometimes more than the average rate, Dutch people think that there are too many 
foreigners living in the Netherlands.  
In this context, when Dutch were asked by eurobarometer surveys that how they 
evaluated the number of foreign people living in their country, % 44 of them in 19912, 
% 49 of them in 19923, % 47 of them in 19944 and % 40 of them in 19975 thought that 
there were too many of them. In that sense, while the EU average of these four years 
was % 47,25 the average rate of Dutch response thinking that there were too many 
foreigners living in the Netherlands was % 45 in that years. 
If survey results are examined in detail, two important indicators are seen. One is 
that Dutch people are very sensitive on crime and the other is that they made foreigners 
                                                 
1 The reason in using eurobarometer surveys here is the belief that they harbor certain 
stability in the survey results due to the fact that they are held every year and two times 
in a year in Europe. The prestige of eurobarometer among the academics, for sure, can 
be counted as anoher reason.  
 
2 Eurobarometer Spring, 1991 table 38. 
 
3 Eurobarometer Spring 37, 1992 figure 5.1. 
 
4 Eurobarometer Autumn 42, 1994, figure 9.9. 
 
5 Eurobarometer Autumn 48, 1997, figure 6.2. 
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identified with crime. That means that the more foreigners in the country live, the more 
crime and insecurity in the Netherlands will occur. In other words, presence of 
foreigners means insecurity for them. Therefore, more than the average, they see crime 
as a priority issue that should be discussed at the EU level. In addition, they oppose the 
idea of common market in the European Union (the EU henceforth) so that it will 
increase immigration and foreign population in the country. The followings are the 
summary of the reports: 
% 57 of Dutch in 19866, % 52 of them in 19977 and % 38 of them in 20048 
believe that the action that the EU should follow in priority is fighting against crime. In 
that sense, while the EU average of these three years thinking that fighting against crime 
should be priority issue in the EU level was % 44, Dutch average rate was % 49. The 
reason behind this can be found in survey results. In this context, while % 26 of the EU 
average thought that crime was the most important issue facing the EU at that moment 
in 2004, this rate was % 47 in the Netherlands.9
The fear of crime of Dutch people was very clear when they opposed Single 
Market. Accordingly, while the EU average was % 30, % 29 of Dutch people were 
afraid of Single Market because of the belief that it would open borders to immigration. 
In addition, while the EU average was % 26, % 33 of Dutch people believed that Single 
Market would also open borders to crime.10 In this context, % 59 of them though that 
the EU enlargement with ten new states in 2004 would cause an increase in 
                                                 
6 Eurobarometer Spring 1986, table 42. 
 
7 Eurobarometer Autumn 48, 1997, p.67. 
 
8 Eurobarometer Autumn 62, 2004, p.33. 
 
9 Eurobarometer 61 Spring, 2004, figure 3.1b. 
 
10 Eurobarometer Autumn 38, 1992, figure 3.6. and p.59. 
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international organized crime in the country.11 In that sense, while the EU average rate 
was % 44, according to % 45 of Dutch, the presence of foreign people was a cause of 
insecurity in their country.12 For that fear, % 98 of them thought that fighting against 
crime should be the criteria for joining the EU.13
Considerable numbers of Dutch people think negatively about foreigners. 
Accordingly, there are too many of them living in their country. At this point, according 
to Hans-Georg Betz, to blame immigrants for growing crime rates is a clear xenophobic 
sentiment.14 In that sense, since Dutch people make foreigners identified with crime, 
they are still xenophobic. In other words, since they think that all foreigners will be 
somehow engaged in crime, Dutch people reactively oppose the existence of foreigners 
in the country. In this context for example, they were afraid of Single Market simply 
because they thought that it would open borders to crime. Similarly, they are still doubt 
about the European enlargement on the ground that it will increase immigrant 
population and so crime in the country.  
On the other hand, responsiveness of a political system to the preferences of its 
citizens is one of the central discussions in the political science. Accordingly, those 
democracies with participant political culture and competitive political party system are 
expected to respond people’s preferences. Commonly, public preferences, inputs, are 
transformed into government policies, outputs. In that sense, state policies are the clear 
expression of citizens’ preferences. That is to say, if society changes, policies also 
                                                 
11 Eurobarometer Autumn 62, 2004, p.143. 
 
12 “Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union”, A special analysis of the 
Eurobarometer 2000 opinion poll on behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia, Technical Report, Vienna, March 2001, p.15. 
 
13 Eurobarometer Autumn 50, 1998, p.87. 
 
14 Betz, Hans-Georg. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Macmillan, 
1994, p.119. 
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change. But, non-democratic states are expected to be less responsive to these 
preferences.15  
However, the way that how preferences could be measured is a controversial 
issue. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of public opinion polls since the 1930s seems to 
fill this gap. Indeed, it is suggested that public opinion polls reflect at least the potential 
preferences of public.16 In that sense, back to the central discussion in political science, 
are public opinions, preferences, responded by politicians and do they shape policy-
making then? 
According to some, public opinions have a strong impact on policy-making. The 
others, on the other hand, do not believe that public opinion affect policy-making at all. 
According to the first thought, political system is responsive to public opinion simply 
because politicians derive at least some benefit from implementing policies that reflect 
the wishes of citizens. Indeed, since state managers and politicians are aware that they 
are rewarded or punished for their previous policy outcomes by voters, they perceive 
the responsiveness to the preferences of their citizens to be in their interests to minimize 
the distance between the rulers and the ruled. In that sense, public opinions are the 
significant factor in explaining different policy outcomes.17  
On the other hand, public opinions polls provide information available to political 
actors about public preferences. At this point, John G. Geer claims that “well-informed 
politicians behave differently than their less well-informed counterparts even when their 
                                                 
15 See Easton, David. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political 
Science. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953. and Dahl, Robert. Who Governs? : 
Democracy and Power in the American City. Yale University Press, 1961. 
 
16 Gallup, George and Rae, Saul. Pulse of Democracy. New York: Simon and Shuster, 
1940, p.266. 
 
17 Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Shapiro, Robert Y. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political 
Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000, Chapter 1. 
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motivations are the same.”18 In that sense, information facilitates responsiveness simply 
because they give politicians the capacity to make rational judgments about where the 
public stands. 
However, the second thought claims that the first thought still lacks the possibility 
that politicians can shape or influence public opinions as well. Indeed, while the public 
opinion can be measured through polls, most expressed opinions in these polls are 
subject to change through manipulation by business, the mass media or even 
government elites. Besides, “public opinion surveys present only a rough idea of what 
people generally think because the results are highly sensitive to a number of 
factors…Polls may even create the impression of public opinion on questions in which 
none actually exists.”19 So, the credibility of public opinion polls is controversial. In 
addition, policy-makers may have their own policy preferences that may come into 
conflict with public preferences. Therefore, politicians and policy-makers might be non-
responsive to public preferences.20  
It might be true that public opinion polls are subject to change and manipulation 
or include survey questions which actually do not exist in reality. On the other hand, the 
aforementioned eurobarometer opinion polls are held by the European Commission to 
monitor the evolution of public opinion in Member States in the EU. Therefore, 
eurobarometer surveys help the preparation of texts and the evaluation of the EU’s 
work. All in all, they help the decision-making in the EU.21 In that sense, eurobarometer 
                                                 
18 Geer, John G. From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic 
Leadership. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.2. 
 
19 Domhoff, G. William. Who Rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000. 
Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1998, p.172. 
 
20 Jacobs and Shapiro, op.cit., p.19. 
 
21 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm  
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polls seem to be far from domestic political maneuvers and manipulation. Besides, their 
questions include certain topics that might exist in the future. For example, they ask 
about immigrants and foreigners on the ground that the EU decided to enlarge in the 
future. In that sense, topics in eurobarometer polls exist in reality. For that reason, this 
study assumes that eurobarometer public opinion polls display certain preferences and 
opinions of people in the EU in general and in the Netherlands in particular.  
At this point, building from Easton, these preferences are input for government 
outputs. To respond these inputs, on the other hand, depends on the initiative of policy-
makers. Nonetheless, building from Easton once again, democratic countries are 
expected to be more responsive to public preferences for policy outputs. In that sense, 
this study also assumes that public opinions in the democratic Netherlands display 
inputs for policy outputs.  
On the other hand, those who have negative feelings about ethnic minorities are 
assumed to favor and prefer restrictive immigration policy.22 In this context, xenophobic 
sentiments of Dutch people are expected to be “input” for government’s “output”. 
However, what is seen in the Dutch case is that domestic preferences, inputs, do not 
feed policy outputs. Indeed, the study will show that although Dutch people are as 
xenophobic as European average, immigration policy of the country is still integrative. 
That means that xenophobic “inputs” of the Dutch do not turn into policy “output” 
favoring restrictive immigration policy. Therefore, the question is why these inputs are 
not transformed into outputs? 
Furthermore, domestic preferences in the Netherlands do not feed political actors 
in the Dutch politics, either. In that sense, if public opinion polls represent the potential 
preferences of public and if considerable number of Dutch people harbor xenophobic 
                                                 
22 Citrin, Jack. et.al. Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic 
Motivations. Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1997, pp. 872-875. 
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sentiments in eurobarometer opinion polls and if Klaus von Beyme is right on the 
ground that the main breeding ground of extreme right parties is xenophobia23; extreme 
right-wing parties in the Netherlands are also expected to be influential in Dutch 
politics. However, what the study shows is that the country still has weaker extreme 
right parties. In that sense, the question is why Dutch extreme right parties are weaker 
contrary to expectations? 
On this ground, the study shows that although Dutch people seem as xenophobic 
as European average, this situation does not dramatically affect the policies that are 
directly related with foreigners. In that sense, I claim that although Dutch people are 
xenophobic, the country has still integrative immigration policy and has weak extreme 
right parties simply because civic nationalism that defines nation on a shared citizenship 
base and the pillar system that allows certain autonomies to diverse cultural groups in 
their private sphere in the Netherlands block certain extremisms in the country.  
  In this context, in the first chapter immigration policy of the Netherlands will be 
summarized to be able to evaluate input-output correlation in the country. However, 
socio-economic reason of immigration will not be analyzed in that part. The real 
question is where the country stands on the issues of immigration policy. In the 
following chapter, Dutch extreme right parties in the political spectrum will be dwelled 
upon to understand the affects of xenophobic sentiments in politics. But, it is worth to 
note that socio-economic background of extreme right voting will not be explained. At 
this point, in spite of xenophobia in the Netherlands, it will be seen that the country has 
still integrative immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition. But how 
can this situation be explained? According to the findings, civic nationalism and the 
                                                 
23 See Von Beyme, Klaus (ed.). Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe. London: 
Frank Cass, 1988. 
 
 8
pillar system very endemic to the Dutch society are two main reasons of this situation. 
Thus, third chapter will explain Dutch nation-building process and theoretically discuss 
the emergence of Dutch nationalism. The fourth chapter then will historically discuss 
the reasons and consequences of pillar system in the country. In this context, in the last 
chapter, the reasons of integrative immigration policy and of weak extreme right in spite 
of xenophobia in the country will be discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
  
 
 
 
Chapter I 
 
 
Immigrants in the Netherlands and the Dutch Immigration Policy 
 
There are certain concepts in explaining the integration of immigrants into the 
host country population. Accordingly, assimilation implies the absorption of all 
immigrants into the host society. Their own culture disappears in favor of host country 
culture and so they no longer identify themselves with their descendants. On the other 
hand, adaptation demands the efforts of immigrants to adopt norms and values of the 
host society. Although a successful integration requires mutual interaction between the 
population of the host country and immigrants, adaptation turns a blind eye to this fact 
and puts the greatest burden on immigrants’ shoulder. Very lastly, integration aims to 
bring different ethnic and cultural groups into the host society with equal opportunities. 
In that sense, instead of absorption into the majority culture, diverse cultures and 
traditions are also developed in integration process.24      
In that sense, there are also certain types of integration: socio-cultural, political 
and legal and structural integration. Socio-cultural integration means that interpersonal 
contacts between different ethnic groups are developed as long as they accept and 
                                                 
24 Junger-Tas, Josine. Ethnic Minorities, Social Integration and Crime. European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,Vol. 9, No.1, 2001, p.8.  
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tolerate their diverse customs, traditions and lifestyles. Political and legal integration, on 
the other hand, is shaped around introducing fundamental civil rights such as freedom 
of religion, granting political rights such as voting or facilitating naturalization 
procedures in favor of ethnic minorities and immigrants. Besides, structural integration 
means that access of immigrants to social and economic institutions like housing, 
education and labor market should be improved to provide equal participation in the 
society.25
On the other hand, thanks to the guest workers and international immigration 
influx since 1960, Netherlands had been transformed into a country harboring diverse 
ethnic and cultural communities inside. At first, immigration to this country was 
characterized by colonial connections. People from the former colonies of the Kingdom 
began to migrate to the Netherlands in the early 1950s. In that period, approximately, 
thirteen thousand of Moluccans and three hundred thousand of Indonesians came into 
the country. In the 1970s, people from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles constituted 
the last migration population from the former colonies. On the other hand, in the 1960s, 
the country also recruited guest workers especially from Turkey and Morocco. After 
first generation immigrants, on the other hand, family re-unification increased the 
number of immigrants in the country. Today, approximately twenty per cent of the 
whole population has non-Dutch origin in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, the official policy in the 1970s was characterized by the belief that 
immigrant workers would stay temporarily simply because contracts between firms and 
workers or between workers and their country of origin emphasized temporal residence. 
Therefore, for a long time, the Netherlands did not develop an integration policy 
precisely because immigrants and especially guest workers were expected to return to 
                                                 
25 Ibid., pp.9-11. 
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their home countries. However, once it was realized by the government that they 
intended to reside permanently, the country developed certain immigration policies.  
In that sense, it is possible to examine the Dutch immigration (integration) policy 
on three stages. At the first stage, in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s, the 
Netherlands implemented socio-cultural integration theme and introduced “Minority 
Policy” (Minorities Memorandum). The main idea behind the Minority Policy was to 
foster ethnic minorities’ incorporation into the majority. In this context, the Policy 
developed cultural rights of immigrants, combated discrimination against them, and 
supported ethnic organizations and institutions since they nurture ethnic identities. At 
this point, for the sake of decreasing the cultural difficulties of immigrants for example, 
they were educated in their native language as part of the orientation courses.26 Besides, 
tolerance for cultural and religious differences became one of the characteristics of 
Minority Policy. Indeed, thanks to the pillarization but also to the Minority Policy, 
immigrants and newcomers could organize themselves along their ethnic or religious 
lines. Indeed, mosques, Islamic and Hindu schools or broadcasting corporations funded 
by municipalities or the government became very salient in Dutch life. Municipalities 
and government, on the other hand, provided certain funds for social and cultural 
activities of ethnic minorities. Indeed, European counterparts envy Dutch ethnic 
minority organizations because of their sizable subsidy and easy access opportunities.27  
At the second stage, the country developed political and legal integration. 
Accordingly, naturalization process was facilitated and dual-citizenship had been 
introduced at this period. In addition, since 1985, those who have legally resided in the 
                                                 
26 Ireland, Patrick. Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004, p. 118. 
 
27 See Doomernik, Jeroen. The institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Germany and the 
Netherlands: A comparison. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1995. 
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Netherlands for five years could both vote and become candidate in local and municipal 
elections.28  
In the 1990s, structural integration had risen. In that sense, the phrase “minority” 
was replaced by “integration” and the new “Integration Policy” based more on equal 
citizenship principal was introduced. Accordingly, the main aim now was to provide 
equal participation of immigrants in the socio-economic sphere like labor market, 
education or housing. For that aim, certain integration courses such as Dutch language 
were held by the government.29  
However, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s, the integration policy of 
country was criticized on the ground that it began to emphasize more Dutch norms and 
values.30 Indeed, in 1998, Law on the Integration of Newcomers (Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers) was introduced by Dutch government. The Bill aimed to provide pre-
arrival integration of newcomers. Those who apply for permanent residence through 
family re-unification for instance, are required to have basic knowledge of Dutch 
language, culture, history and institutions before their arrival to the Netherlands. In that 
sense, they have to pass a related test held in Dutch embassies and consulates in the 
world. On 22 March 2005, the Bill was approved by the Parliament. However, the 
                                                 
28 Böcker, Anita. The impact of host-society institutions on the integration of Turkish 
immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. Paper presented at the workshop on 
integration of immigrants from Turkey in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, 
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, February 27-28, 2004, p.9. 
http://www.ces.boun.edu.tr/papers/feb/anta_bocker.pdf  
 
29 Engbersen, Godfried. Spheres of Integration: Towards a Differentiated and Reflexive 
Ethnic Minority Policy, in R. Sackmann, B. Peters and T. Faist (eds.), Identity and 
Integration: Migrants in Western Europe. Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2003, p. 63. 
 
30 Penninx, Rinus., Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca. and Scholten, Peter. Policymaking 
Related to Immigration and  Integration: A Review of the Literature of the Dutch Case. 
p.5. 
http://www.imiscoe.org/workingpapers/documents/country_report_netherlands.pdf. 
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implementation date of it was postponed.31 According to this law, all newcomers 
allowed to reside permanently in the Netherlands should prove their proficiency in 
Dutch. Otherwise, they are required to follow nearly 600 hours Dutch language courses 
in which they will also learn Dutch institutions, norms, values, history and geography. 
After the courses, newcomers are examined. In these exams, it is possible to see a video 
displaying a gay marriage or to read a question whether to sunbathe topless on the 
Dutch beaches is ok or not. Although citizens from the EU countries and from the 
European Economic Area are exempt from these courses and exams, its final aim is still 
to provide early participation of newcomers especially from the Middle East into the 
Dutch society. Accordingly, once they increase their competence they become socially 
and professionally independent and are able to participate in society.32  
In 1999, in addition to the obligatory integration courses of newcomers, the 
government introduced a similar integration schedule for those who stay in the country 
for a long time but have little knowledge of the Dutch as newcomers. They can 
purchase the course themselves from the private providers. The government, on the 
other hand, will provide credit and compensation for costs of the courses providing that 
participants pass their exams within the specified time. The time limitation for 
newcomers is three and a half years and it is five years for the others.33 If the examinee 
                                                 
31 Marinelli, Vera. Current Immigration Debates in Europe. A Publication of the 
European Migration Dialogue: The Netherlands. The Migration Policy Group, 
Brussels/Utrecht, September 2005, p. 6. 
http://www.migpolgroup.com/multiattachments/3009/DocumentName/EMD_Netherlan
ds_2005.pdf 
 
32 Doomernik, Jeroen. The Effectiveness of Integration Policies towards Immigrants and 
their Descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands. ILO, International 
Migration Papers 27, Geneve, 1998, p.65. 
 
33 Marinelli, op.cit., p. 10. 
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fails the exam, he or she is imposed certain administrative fines by the municipalities. In 
addition, their benefits might be cutted or residence permit might be terminated.34
On this ground, in order to evaluate the integration policy of the Netherlands a 
parliamentary inquiry committee, known as the Blok Committee, was set up in 2002. In 
2004, the committee submitted its report to the parliament and concluded that many 
immigrants have been successfully integrated into the Dutch society. Nevertheless, it 
also explained that measures against illegal immigration have increased and a more 
emphasis on Dutch norms and values has been introduced especially after 2002. 
Accordingly, since immigrants were firstly required to learn Dutch culture and 
language, ethnic language and culture courses for ethnic pupils in primary schools were 
cancelled. Turkish or Arabic teachers were dismissed. However, the committee added 
that they could still learn the language and culture of their country of origin in 
secondary schools. Indeed, one of the highest aims of the government is to achieve 
equal opportunities for all. Accordingly, combating educational disadvantages take a 
crucial place in the Dutch integration policy. In that sense, in secondary education, 
immigrants have opportunity to study their own language.  Many Turkish or Moroccan 
immigrants’ children, for instance, learn Turkish or Arabic in their schools. However, in 
primary education, they are required to learn Dutch.35 In addition, as cited in the report, 
the Ministry of Education supports the development of related teaching materials for 
Arabic and Turkish and directly allocates the funds given to these schools. According to 
the Ministry, pupils in primary schools are expected to learn the language of the country 
they live. Nonetheless, in the secondary schools, they are expected to develop their 
                                                 
34 Smith, Nicola. Pass this test, Dutch tell immigrants. The Sunday Times, June 18, 
2006. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2230733,00.html  
 
35 Leeman, Yvonne. and Pels, Trees. Citizenship Education in the Dutch Multiethnic 
Context. European Education, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2006, p. 66.  
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language skills other than Dutch such as Turkish and Arabic to incorporate into an 
ethnically plural society they live in.36 Moreover, the report explained that the 
government reached an agreement with Small and Medium Seized Entrepreneurs on the 
introduction of new jobs for ethnic minorities. They were also warned to employ ethnic 
women in their companies. Similarly, social participation of immigrant women should 
also be promoted by the municipalities.37    
On the other hand, in the 1990s, concerning the labor market, it was clear that 
immigrants remained behind the local people. Indeed, unemployment rate was 
approximately three times higher than that of indigenous Dutch persons. In order to 
remedy this problem, policy makers introduced certain courses which provided learning 
of Dutch and appropriate labor skills for immigrants. In this way, individuals were 
expected to ensure their integration into the society. Municipalities, on the other hand, 
were the primary institutions in leading these integration courses. 
Besides, according to the Dutch integration policy, certain quotas should be 
allocated between ethnic groups in public jobs provided by municipalities and 
government and in private sector jobs provided by employers.38 Indeed, since 1987, the 
number of immigrant employees in the public sector is tried to be increased by the 
government. On the other hand, in 1992, an enacted law, Youth Employment Guarantee 
Law, made work available for those who were under 21 and have been unemployed for 
                                                 
36 Extra, Guus. and Yağmur, Kutlay. Immigrant Minority Languages at Home and at 
School :A Case Study of the Netherlands. European Education, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2006, 
pp.55-7. 
 
37 The Blok Committee, 2004. 
 
38 See Doomernik, Jeroen. Integration Policies towards Immigrants and their 
Descendants in the Netherlands,  in F. Heckmann and D. Schnapper (eds), The 
Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of 
Convergence. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2003. 
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six months.39 In addition, following an act enacted by the government in 1993, medium 
sized employers were obliged to send a yearly report to the Labor Authority stating the 
number of ethnic minorities among their personnel. Besides, they should explain their 
measures to hire more ethnic minorities.40  
In that sense, in comparison to its counterparts, the Netherlands has more liberal 
immigration policy. Indeed, officially, France does not recognize any ethnic differences 
among its citizens or not allow for any cultural, say religious, dress such as large 
Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps or Islamic headscarves in schools for example.41 In 
contrast, there are certain state sponsored ethnic and religious organizations varied from 
schools to broadcasting corporations in the Netherlands. Children of different ethnic 
groups in this country, for example, learn their native language in public schools. In that 
sense, concerning immigrants and ethnic groups, one could argue that unlike France, the 
Netherlands implies an integrative policy rather than an assimilative policy. 
In addition, non-EU nationals in Germany do not have the right to vote at all. 
However, they can vote at the local elections in the Netherlands. Although they are 
highly encouraged to be employed in public sector in the Dutch case, the similar jobs 
are barred to foreigners in Germany. Although the number of Turks in Germany is 
nearly eight times higher than in the Netherlands, only %20 of the Turkish immigrants 
hold German citizenship. However, this rate is 70% in the Netherlands.42 Accordingly, 
after five years of legal residence, a non-Dutch citizen can obtain Dutch citizenship 
                                                 
39 Doomernik (1998), op.cit., p.62. 
 
40 Ibid., p.64. 
 
41 See Calvès, Gwénaële. Color-Blindness at a Crossroads in Contemporary France, in 
Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader (eds), Race in France: Interdisiplinary 
Perspectives on the Politics of Difference. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004. 
 
42 Böcker, op.cit., p. 2. 
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without renouncing his/her foreign nationality. Besides, the children of immigrants born 
in the Netherlands gain automatic Dutch citizenship.43
In this context, since ethnic nationalism and assimilation traditions perceive 
nation as a culturally homogeneous community, they are reluctant to the expression of 
cultural or religious identities in public life. Indeed, this was very clear when France 
banned the religious symbols at schools or some federal states in Germany prepared 
legislation to forbid the headscarf for civil servants.44 However, according to Sawitri 
Saharso, the tradition of civic nationalism and pillar system in the Netherlands “allows 
for relatively great recognition of cultural difference and grants religious identities 
much visibility in public life. Religious symbols, irrespective of which religion they 
symbolize, therefore find easy acceptance in Dutch public life.”45
Among the others, the Netherlands is one of the European countries that hosts 
certain amount of immigrant in its territory. In that sense, after the government realized 
that immigrants would stay permanently, the country developed immigration policies. 
Accordingly, the Netherlands granted cultural rights to the immigrants in the late 1970s 
and in the early 1980s. Moreover, the government granted political and civil rights to 
them in the middle of 1980s. Besides, accesses of immigrants to labor market, education 
or housing have been improved in the 1990s. However, in the late 1990s and in the 
early 2000s, the integration policy of the country was criticized so that it emphasized 
more Dutch norms and values. Nonetheless, its integrative structures are still dominant. 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 3. 
 
44 German state backs headscarf ban 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3591043.stm  
 
45 Saharso, Sawitri. Headscarves: A Comparison of Public Thought and Public Policy 
in Germany and the Netherlands, p.18. 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/generalconference/budapest/papers/4/8/saharso.pd
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Indeed, many immigrants’ children can learn their country of origin language in 
secondary schools. On the other hand, government and municipalities fund social and 
cultural activities of ethnic minorities. Job opportunities for immigrants in public and 
private sectors are developed. In addition, in comparison to their counterparts, 
immigrants in the Netherlands enjoy certain rights in the country. Indeed, while France 
does not recognize any cultural differences among its citizens, immigrants in the 
Netherlands can freely access their ethnic and religious organizations. Besides, unlike in 
Germany, they can vote and be candidate at the local elections. More than this, gaining 
a Dutch citizenship is relatively easier in this country than in Germany. All in all, the 
country still prefers integration rather than assimilation or adaptation.   
On the contrary of input-output correlation in theory, it was seen in this chapter 
that xenophobic sentiments of Dutch people cannot shape the immigration policy of the 
country in favor of assimilation. On the other hand, do xenophobic sentiments of Dutch 
people strengthen the position of extreme right-wing parties in the Netherlands? Where 
do these parties stand in Dutch politics? The following chapter will be focusing on this 
issue. 
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Chapter II 
 
 
Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Dutch Politics 
 
 
1) Explaining Extreme Right 
 
The core ideology of extreme right is based on the notion of restrictive citizenship 
and homogeneous community “that only long-standing citizens are full members of 
civil society and that a society’s benefits should only accrue to them.”46 In that sense, 
they oppose individual and social equality, they reject the social integration of 
marginalized groups and they appeal to xenophobia.47 Indeed, according to Klaus von 
Beyme, the main breeding-ground of extreme right parties is xenophobia.48 In other 
                                                 
46 Betz, Hans-Georg. The Growing Threat of the Radical Right, in Peter H. Merkl and 
Leonard Weinberg (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. London: 
Frank Cass, 2003, p.77. 
 
47 Betz (1994), op.cit., p.4. The Oxford English Dictionary defines xenophobia as “a 
morbid fear of foreigners or foreign countries”. In that sense, foreign things like foreign 
customs and foreign culture are the main factors of fear. This reflects a situation of 
aversion to foreigners or strangers. 
 
48 See von Beyme, op.cit.  
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words, only nationals should benefit the state-provided goods such as housing, jobs and 
social payments.49 In this sense, it demands the exclusion of unemployed foreigners and 
foreigners charged with committing a crime and the stop of all transfer payments to 
asylum-seekers and refugees under the slogan of “the own people first”.  
Besides, extreme right has a special focus on Islam. Accordingly, the growing 
numbers of Muslim immigrants are seen as the main challenge and threat to Western 
culture simply because the Islamic order is not compatible with the Western values such 
as human rights, democracy and the equality of woman.50 Therefore, extreme right aims 
to protect national identity from hostile cultures and values.  
On the other hand, extreme right-wing parties count certain issues precondition 
for the survival of the indigenous society. Accordingly, these issues are respectively 
immigration, fear of crime, social and economic insecurity because of increased crime 
and unemployment and drugs trafficking.51 Indeed, according to Wouter van der Brug 
et. al., “negative attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for 
anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties.”52 and according to Betz, 
xenophobic sentiments are clear when indigenous people of Europe blame immigrants 
for growing crime rates.53 Thus, extreme right issues are clearly laid on foreigners and 
xenophobia. 
                                                 
49 Hainsworth, Paul. Introduction: the extreme right, in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The 
Politics of the Extreme Right: From the margins to the mainstream. Pinter, 2000, p.10. 
 
50 Betz (2003), op.cit., p.84. 
 
51 Betz (1994), op.cit., p.67. 
 
52 Van der Brug, Wouter., Fennema, Meindert. and Tillie, Jean. Anti-immigrant parties 
in Europe: Ideological or protest vote?. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 
37, No.1, 2000, p.77.   
 
53 Ibid., p.119. 
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In addition, foreigners are blamed for all problems of society ranging from 
unemployment and crime, to declining standards in health and in education. In this 
context, according to Paul Hainsworth, the opposition of extreme right to immigration 
and immigrants is “inspired by ethnocentric54, xenophobic, exclusionary and often out-
right racist representations of the nation.”55  
Some extreme nationalists may prefer to vote for center-right political parties 
instead of extreme right-wing parties. Nevertheless, only extreme right-wing parties in 
the Netherlands will be discussed precisely because they minces no words while the 
center-right parties are more cautious in their policies.56 For example, while it is more 
likely that an extreme right-wing party uses a xenophobic discourse in its election 
campaign, a center right party may not chose the similar slogans of the extreme right-
wing. That is to say while those who vote for extreme right-wing parties are counted as 
extreme or ultra nationalist, it is too hard, if not impossible, to pick up extreme 
nationalist votes in a center-right party turnouts precisely because the latter party does 
not use an explicit xenophobic or nationalist discourse. So, in comparison to 
mainstream right-wing parties, studying extreme right parties give clearer results in 
showing the xenophobic and illiberal base in a certain country. However, it is also clear 
that extreme right-wing turnouts do not show whole illiberal or xenophobic picture in 
                                                 
54 Ethnocentrism refers to the situation in which the positive characteristics of in-group 
and the negative characteristics of out-groups are predominantly selected. In this way, it 
contributes to the maintenance of a positive identity. Besides, ethnocentrism shows a 
positive attitude toward in-group but a negative attitude toward out-groups. In this 
sense, it harbors positive prejudices and superiority about one's own social groups and 
negative prejudices about other ethnic groups. See Billiet, Jaak., Eisinga, Rob. and 
Scheepers, Peer. Ethnocentrism in the Low Countries: a comparative perspective.  New 
Community, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1996, p.402 
 
55 Hainsworth, op.cit., p.10. 
 
56 Betz (2003), op.cit., p.89. 
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the country. Nevertheless, for the aforementioned reasons, extreme right-wing parties in 
the Netherlands will be historically discussed below. 
 
2) Extreme Right-Wing Parties in the Netherlands 
 
Although it lost its southern part to the Belgium in 1830, this did not cause a 
revenge movement in the Netherlands and so aspiration for the Greater Netherlands was 
not the case in Dutch politics. Nonetheless, especially after the immigration influx, 
extreme right parties also arose in the Dutch politics.  
The Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (National Socialist Movement, NSB) was 
founded in December 1931. The party adopted nationalist socialism and formed an 
armed militia. At that time it had nearly 50,000 members. However, the NSB could not 
exceed 4 percent of the total votes in the 1937 general elections. But, after the Nazi 
occupation, the party began to play an important role in the Dutch politics and became 
only legal political party of the Netherlands. However, the party program did not 
include certain typical National Socialist features like racism and anti-Semitism. 
Nevertheless, after the war, most of the members of the NSB were imprisoned and any 
future para-fascist movement was forbidden by the constitution.57
In the post-war era, Nationaal Europese Social Beweging (National European 
Social Movement, the NESB) had been founded in 1953 under the leadership of ex-
Dutch Nazis. However, it was outlawed by the Supreme Court in 1955.58 For that 
reason, after the fascism and Nazism experience of Europe, it was too hard for people to 
display their extreme right opinions in the post-war period. Thus, it was only 1970s that 
                                                 
57 Ignazi, Piero. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, 
2003, p.162. 
 
58 Ibid., p.163. 
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extreme rightists could comeback to the Dutch politics. So, the Nederlandse Volks-Unie 
(Dutch People’s Union, NVU) was founded in March 1971 and immediately 
radicalized. Accordingly, the constituent principal of the NVU was to found a Great 
Dutch State and unify all the Flemish-speaking people in it after expelling all ethnically 
diverse groups. Therefore, Ignazi labels the NVU as an ethnocentric nationalist party. 
Indeed, the party chairman, Glimmerveen, invoked and fostered violence against 
immigrants. However, the extremism did not resonate among the Dutch people and the 
party only took 0.4 per cent of all votes of the 1977 elections.59  
Later on, a group of people from NVU left the party due to it was too radicalized 
and founded a moderate but still extremist Nationale Centrumpartij (National Center 
Party, NCP) in December 1979. However, after their first party meeting in February 
1980, some younger party members raided a church in Amsterdam simply because 
some illegal foreigners were taking shelter against expulsion there. Then, this caused a 
huge protest in Dutch society and so NCP had to dissolve itself. Nonetheless, some of 
the NCP members founded the Centrumpartij (Center Party, CP) in the following days. 
Although it was splitted from the NVU, unlike the NVU, the CP’s constituent 
principal was not extremist nationalism but preservation of Dutch culture. Nevertheless, 
its primary policy was shaped around the immigration topic. Accordingly, the other 
problems such as unemployment or corruption of cultural identity were the pure results 
of immigration and immigrants. So, illegal immigrants must be expelled and the legal 
ones must be forced to integrate into the Dutch society. In that sense, it is clear that the 
CP also followed ethnocentric policies. The party won 1 seat of 150 in the 1982 the 
parliamentary elections. This seat was taken by party leader, Hans Janmaat. However, 
its best result was 1984 European elections and reached 2.5 % of all votes in the 
                                                 
59 Ibid., p.164. 
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Netherlands. Nevertheless, domestic tensions and competition for party leadership led 
to a split: Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats, CD) and Centrumpartij’ 86 (Center 
Party’86, CP’86).60   
The CD was founded in November 1984 and soon Janmaat joined the party and 
became the party leader. Like the CP, the CD also constituted its policies around the 
immigration issue which it describes as foreign occupation. Indeed, the leader of the 
CD, Janmaat, stated that :  
     [E]ndless [the parliamentary] debates indicate one of the weak spots of democracy. For 
it seems to me impossible to reach solutions when ideas are opposed to each other. These 
oppositions are reinforced by ideas and values of the multicultural society which do not 
increase but undermine the strength of our political system (italics added).61  
      
In addition, during an interview published in an independent weekly 
newsmagazine, he expressed tolerance as a personal and ethnic characteristic that Dutch 
have and the others lack: “Netherlands has always been a tolerant country. The 
foreigners who come here have no tolerance.”62 Therefore, the CD was only party 
capable of reconstituting Dutch culture and defending Dutch interest, norms and values. 
Indeed, the CD ideologically followed the ethnocentric nationalist tradition of the 
CP. In other words, the party program and the ideology of the CD heavily focused on 
the immigration issue. In this sense, the party policies fluctuated between assimilation 
and repatriation. This was very clear at the 2nd chapter of 1989 party program: 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p.165. 
 
61 Quoted in Ignazi, op.cit., p.166. 
 
62 De Groene Amsterdammer, 7 October 1992. 
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“Foreigners and minorities either adjust to the Dutch ways and customs or leave the 
country.”63 Other clear statements of ethnocentric tradition were as follows: 
- stop discrimination against the Dutch; 
- place asylum seekers in labor camps; 
- stop the destruction of Dutch culture; 
- control the movement of travelers at the border; 
- the Netherlands is not an immigration country.64    
     
The CP, on the other hand, was soon convicted of electoral fraud and so 
bankrupted. Few days later, the Centrumpartij’ 86 (Center Party’86, CP’86) was 
established in May 1986. Therefore, two parties, CD and CP’86, began to compete on 
the legacy of the CP in the Dutch politics. Later on, the CD, taken by Janmaat, won a 
seat in the Second Chamber65 in 1989. One year later, the CD won 11 and CP’86 won 4 
seats at the municipal elections66. In 1991, the CD perpetuated its success in comparison 
                                                 
63 Quoted in Mudde, Cas. and Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. The Netherlands: explaining the 
limited success of the extreme right, in Paul Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the 
Extreme Right: From the margins to the mainstream. Pinter, 2000, p. 150.  
 
64 Ibid., p.151. 
 
65 It is the States General that represents the people of the Netherlands. It consists of a 
Lower House or Second Chamber (Tweede Kamer) and an Upper House or First 
Chamber (Eerste Kamer). While the former is composed of one hundred and fifty 
members the latter is composed of seventy-five members. The members of both Houses 
are renewed in every four year. In this sense, the members of the Lower House are 
directly elected by Dutch nationals. However, the members of the Upper House are 
indirectly elected by Dutch people. Accordingly, its members are elected by the 
members of the provincial councils. Upper House cannot propose or amend laws but 
only reject them. The cabinet can be dismissed by the States General after a vote of no 
confidence. See The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2002). article 50-
5. 
 
66 The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces, Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, 
Overijssel, Flevoland, Gelderland, Utrecht, North Holland, South Holland, Zeeland, 
North Brabant and Limburg, and all provinces are divided into municipalities, 458 in 
total in January 2006. The provinces and municipalities are respectively headed by 
provincial and municipal councils and the members of both councils are directly elected 
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to CP’86 and won 3 seats at the provincial elections of North Holland, South Holland 
and Utrecht. In 1994, the CD increased its seats to 77 and the CP’86 increased to 8 at 
the municipal elections. On the other hand, while the CP’86 only took 0.4 per cent of all 
votes, the CD took 2.5 per cent and so gained three seats at the 1994 general elections.  
Nevertheless, the 1990s was the beginning of the end for both parties. 
Accordingly, first Janmaat and the CD but later the CP’86 were convicted for 
provocation to racial hatred in 1994 and 1995 because of their “own people first” 
policies. As a result, both parties and Janmaat were fined to violate the Constitution 
regulation which delegitimates racial hatred. More than this, the CP’86 was banned and 
dissolved by the Amsterdam court in 1998 simply because the court found that the 
policies of the CP’86 exceeded the boundaries of democratic rule of law.67 On the other 
hand, after 1998 general elections, the CD lost its all seats and so disappeared from the 
parliament. Thereafter, Janmaat left the party leadership and the CD could not submit a 
list of candidates on 15 May 2002 and 22 November 2006 general elections. 
Nonetheless, the CD still manages to survive.     
In the 2000s, most famous politician in the Netherlands was Pim Fortuyn. Livable 
Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland, the LN), on the other hand, was the stepping stone 
for his political career. The LN was founded on 21 March 1999. The party was the 
national continuation of two local parties, Leefbaar Hilversum and Leefbaar Utrecht. 
The LN was actually an anti-establishment party of the left. However, once Pim 
Fortuyn, an ex-member of Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid, the PvdA) became the 
party leader on 25 November 2001, the party did slide to the right. Thereafter, when 
                                                                                                                                               
with proportional representation by Dutch nationals reside in that province or 
municipality. The duration of these councils are four years. See The Constitution of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (2002). article 123-36. 
 
67 Mudde and Van Holsteyn, op.cit., pp.144-49. 
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Fortuyn stated in an interview on 9 February 2002 that “Islam was a backward culture, 
that no new asylum seekers would be allowed”, and that “if necessary to protect 
freedom of speech, the first article of the Constitution should be repealed”68 he caused a 
bombshell in the Dutch politics and next day he was dismissed from the leadership of 
LN. However, when a LN type local party Leefbaar Rotterdam, lead by Fortuyn, won 
17 of 45 seats with 35 per cent of votes in municipal council, Fortuyn decided to 
participate to the general elections with his own List Fortuyn.69  
In this context, the List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the LPF) was created by 
Pim Fortuyn in February 2002 and immediately got strong among the other parties. 
According to the election polls, for example, the LPF was expected to win considerable 
seats in the parliaments. However, on 6 May 2002, he was shot to death by an animal 
rights activist, Volkert van der Graaf. He said: “I confess to the shooting. He was an 
ever growing danger who would affect many people in society. I saw it as a danger. I 
hoped that I could solve it myself.”70 This caused a stunning effect in the Dutch politics 
simply because since William of Orange was killed in Delft in 1584, there was no other 
assassination of a political leader in the Netherlands. Therefore, thousands of people 
immediately crowded into the streets and did shout and riot. Just nine days after his 
assassination, on the other hand, the LPF became the second party in the general 
elections of May 15. It gained 26 seats of 150 with 17 per cent of votes and so 
                                                 
68 Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M. and Irwin, Galen A. Never a dull moment: Pim Fortuyn and 
the Dutch Parliamentary Election of 2002. West European Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2, 
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69 Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.46. 
 
70 Quoted in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Joan Clements, Fortuyn killed ‘to protect 
Muslims’. London Daily Telegraph, 28/03/2003.
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participated to the coalition government with four ministers. However, after his death, 
the fights between the party members especially for the party leadership had weakened 
the LPF. Moreover, the conflict between vice-prime minister Eduard Bomhoff and 
minister of Economic Affairs Herman Heinsbroek, two LPF ministers in the Cabinet, 
immediately signaled the coalition partners Liberal Party and the Christian-Democratic 
Appeal to resign.71 In this sense, Premier Balkenende asked the Queen for his 
resignation on October 16,
 
2002. New election was held in 22 January 2003 and the 
LPF lost 18 seats. The new coalitional government was formed without the LPF on 27 
May 2003.72 Currently, the LPF is out of the parliament after it lost its all seats in the 
general elections held on 22 November 2006.73
Extreme right-wing parties combine hierarchical party structure with charismatic 
leadership and a populist discourse. They employ anti-establishment messages together 
with scapegoating of immigrants.74 In this context, Fortuyn predicated his election 
campaign on two issues: to restructure the public sector and to restrict the policy on 
asylum seekers.75 In that sense, during his campaign, he linked the issues such as crime, 
                                                 
71 Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.58. 
 
72 Ghillebaert, Christian-Pierre. Miscasting Politicians in the Netherlands. What 
remains of the fellowship of Pim Fortuyn after a brief ruling time?. p.1. 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws6/GHILLEB
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73 In 2006 elections, another political party with a xenophobic leader entered into the 
parliament. Partij voor de Vrijheid (The Party for Freedom, the PvdV) lead by Geert 
Wilders won 9 seats in the parliament with 5.9 % of all votes. However, since the PvdV 
is a very fresh event, academic discussions about the party and Geert Wilders are still 
lacked. Therefore, at least at the moment, the results of 2006 elections cannot be 
discussed here in detail.  
 
74 Zaslove, Andrej. The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right. 
European Integration, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2004, p.61. 
 
75 Van Holsteyn and Irwin, op.cit., p.45. 
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poor public services or insecurity to immigration.76 However, it is hard to label him as 
racist. Indeed, according to Ghillebaert, Fortuyn was not an ethnic nationalist. He gave 
for instance no hint of anti-Semitism. In addition, party program of the LPF prioritized 
the keeping of Frisian cultural good. However, his Islamophobia was quite clear: “since 
the collapse of German Nazism, the world has not known any ideology as cruel and 
imperialistic as that of Islam.”77  
On the other hand, as Pennings and Keman explained, in the case of immigrants, 
far from liberal nationalism, the LPF asked foreigners to adapt Dutch culture instead of 
their social and cultural integration into the society. However, it did not express and 
display any tough anti-immigration stances or strict law order against immigrants. It 
only criticized the fragmentation of society. Therefore, according to them, the LPF 
cannot be classified as an extreme right-wing party like Freiheitliche Partei Österreich 
(Austrian Freedom Party, the FPÖ) or Front National (National Front, the FN). Instead, 
it resembles other center right-wing Christian Democrat parties in Europe.78 Indeed, 
                                                 
76 Bruff, Ian. The Netherlands, the Challenge of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, and the Third Way. 
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2003, p. 158. 
 
77 Ghillebaert, op.cit., p. 20. 
 
78 Pennings, Paul. and Keman, Hans. The Dutch parliamentary Elections in 2002 and 
2003: The Rise and Decline of the Fortuyn Movement.  Acta Politica, Vol. 38, No. 1, 
2003, p.62. Broadly speaking, Christian Democracy can be described as liberal insofar 
as it emphasizes human rights, as conservative insofar as it emphasizes law and order 
and rejects communism and lastly as socialist insofar as it emphasizes welfare state and 
prioritizes alleviation of poverty. However, in contrast to liberalism, conservatism and 
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of a community he/she has duties towards it; unlike conservatism, it is open to change; 
and lastly it is open to market economy but not to class struggle. See Roberts, Geoffrey 
K. and Hogwood, Patricia. European Politics Today. Manchester University Press, 
1997. Indeed, the LPF was liberal while it prioritized the keeping of Frisian cultural 
good but illiberal while it asked foreigners to adapt Dutch culture. Moreover, the party 
was conservative while it criticized the fragmentation of society but non-conservative 
while it aimed to restructure the public sector. Lastly, the party was quite close to 
socialism while it intended to restore health care system in the country. See below. 
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while many scholars call the CD as an extreme right party, they call the LPF as an anti-
establishment party.79
In that sense, according to Ian Bruff, the popularity of the LPF stems from its anti-
establishment stance rather than its xenophobic outlook.80 Indeed, Fortuyn’s election 
campaign was based on the rejection of coalitional government of the past eight years. 
Therefore, in his book, The Mess of Eight Purple Years (De puinhopen van acht jaar 
Paars), he heavily criticized the governmental policies of the time. As Van Holsteyn 
and Irwin explained, voters’ evaluation of the governmental economic performance was 
positive in 2002. But, although the government was quite successful in economic 
policies, without mentioning these successes, Fortuyn only spoke of the problems that 
the coalition created. Among the others, policies on education, health care system, 
asylum seekers and minorities were the mess that the government created. Accordingly, 
insecurity in the streets, insufficient number of teachers in the schools or the long 
waiting lists in hospitals were by-products of government policies. Nonetheless, during 
his campaign, Fortuyn recommended that these problems could only be solved by 
small-scale community organizations. For instance, a small hospital or a small school 
could be managed by their own personnel and do not need even any managers.81 
Therefore, according to Van Holsteyn and Irwin, those who were dissatisfied with the 
governmental performance were the most susceptible to the Fortuyn’s campaign. Thus, 
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political and social dissatisfaction with the government policies at the time of the 
election was an important factor in the LPF’s electoral success.82 In other words, protest 
votes were the determinant of 2002 elections.  
In addition, Fortuyn’s assassination positively contributed to the LPF’s votes in 
the elections.83 Indeed, as Bruff stated, Fortuyn's murder changed the voters' preferences 
and enabled the LPF to capture 12 per cent more votes than the expected one.84
On the other hand, proportional representation was another factor favored the 
LPF’s success. As Andeweg and Irwin stated Netherlands is “one of the most 
proportional systems in the world.”85 Accordingly, the whole Netherlands constitutes a 
single electorate and those candidates who takes approximately 0.67 % of votes (about 
60,000 votes) are elected. In addition, approximately 10 out of 20 parties in the 
elections win seat in the parliament but, up to now, no party have won the majority of 
the votes in the history of Dutch politics. Therefore, this proportionality makes it easier 
for political parties to enter into the Dutch parliament.86 In other words, to see an 
extreme right party in the parliament is strongly possible under the Dutch proportional 
representation. 
In short, since the LPF did not follow clear racist, any tough anti-immigration 
stances or strict law policies against foreigners, it seems hard to classify it as an extreme 
right-wing party. In that sense, the success of the LPF can be found in its anti-
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establishment rather than its “xenophobic” stance. Indeed, those who were dissatisfied 
with the policies of the coalition government of the period were the most susceptible to 
the LPF’s campaign. Fortuyn’s assassination, on the other hand, positively contributed 
to the LPF’s votes. Last but not least, proportional representation system also favored 
the LPF. 
Since there is no aspiration for the Greater Netherlands, the Dutch extreme right 
parties formed their policy around the issue of immigration and immigrants. Roughly, 
other problems such as unemployment or corruption of cultural identity were the clear 
results of foreigners. So, immigration to the Netherlands must be stopped, illegal 
immigrants must be expelled and the legal ones must be forced to adapt to the Dutch 
society. Nevertheless, extreme right parties in the Netherlands have always had limited 
success in Dutch politics. Up to the foundation of LPF, their vote potentials in the 
general elections fluctuated between 1 and 3 per cent.87 In academic discussions, on the 
other hand, the LPF is still seen as right wing party rather than extreme right-wing one. 
In that sense, without too much emphasis on xenophobic policies, its anti-establishment 
stance during the electoral campaign was the main reason behind the success of the 
LPF. 
Up to now, it was seen that although considerable numbers of Dutch people are 
xenophobic in public opinion survey results, the country has still integrative 
immigration policy and has weak extreme right party tradition. In other words, 
regarding immigration policy, xenophobic sentiments of public, input, do not shape 
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policy outputs and regarding extreme right, xenophobia does not feed extreme right-
wing parties in the Netherlands. But how can this situation be explained? What are the 
reasons and consequences of it? According to the findings, civic definition of nation on 
a shared citizenship notion and the pillarization of society in the Netherlands are two 
main determinants of the aforementioned situation. The following two chapters will be 
discussing these topics.   
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Chapter III 
 
 
The Dutch Nationalism  
 
 
1) Types of Nationalism 
 
1.1) What is Nationalism? 
 
People in different groups have different aims and interests. However, sometimes 
these people might not know their aims and so the social group that they are member of 
does not make sense for them. In this context, ideology tells its believers their common 
interests and it shows how to reach them.88    
As an ideology, nationalism is a modern discourse. British rebellion against 
monarchy in the seventeenth century, New World’s struggles against Iberian 
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colonialism in eighteenth century, the French revolution of 1789, the German reaction 
to German disunity and to French revolution are counted as the origins of nationalism.89   
In that sense, the most famous argument of nationalism is to organize the nation 
under a nation-state. But to define “nationalism” is not a simple task. As Andrew 
Vincent truly points out, “there is no one nationalist doctrine – there are rather 
nationalisms”90 or in Ignatieff’s words, nationalism “is not one thing in many disguises, 
but many things in many disguises.”91 So, there are different connotations for 
nationalism. According to Ernest Gellner, for instance, nationalism is “a principle which 
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”92 For Haas, on the other 
side, it is “a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or 
that they already are one.”93 One common meaning is loyalty to the state. The other is 
having an independent state for its own nation. Accordingly, nationalism demands that 
people of the world who are divided into nations should be granted self-determination 
right. This right either requires “self-governing entities within existing states” or “stand-
alone nation states.”94  
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Therefore, since nationalism demands a political community, it needs certain 
boundaries that pre-modern ethnicity does not. Indeed, regarding the self-determination 
rights, nationalism is an attempt to demarcate political communities and to provide 
legitimate rule in referencing to “the people” of a country. Ethnic identities, on the other 
hand, do not claim “national” autonomy but rather recognition inside and outside the 
state boundaries.95 Nationalism also requires internal homogeneity throughout a certain 
nation rather than a sub-cultural distinction. So, ethnicity and cultural traditions are 
essential ingredients of nationalism in so far they constitute historical memory or 
habitus.96
On the other hand, in nationalism, national identities trump other group or 
personal identities such as family or ethnicity and individuals are directly linked to the 
nation. Nonetheless, many ethnic identities stem from kinship or family membership.97 
In this context, regarding the cultural ideal, nationalism explains that although 
individuals can have many different identities, moral worth is realized only through 
belonging to a nation. For example, according to Ignatieff, “[a]s a moral ideal, 
nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defence 
of one’s nation against enemies, internal or external.”98 Similarly, for Bowden, “it 
requires that one must be willing put the nation first – to die in defence of the nation if 
need be.”99  
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On this ground, individuals owe their loyalty to the nation over any other sub-
group to realize and maintain this moral worth. But unfortunately, this logic brings a 
blind adherence: “my country, right or wrong”. Clearly, this is the extreme form of 
nationalism that caused the darkest ages of humanity. However, civic or liberal 
nationalism in which the membership of the nation is based on the equal rights of 
citizenship are counted as an alternative to this extreme form. Accordingly, an 
adherence to a nation must not be at the expense of the others.100    
In this context, one of the claims of nationalism is the national superiority. 
Accordingly, it asserts that one’s culture, ethnic group or history are superior to 
neighboring nations simply because when the nation is idealized as the highest moral 
platform then the external nations are subordinated, are not trusted and pose a possible 
threat.101 However, Halliday’s question shows the potential danger: “Yet what if the lies 
of one movement conflict with the lies of another? Are they equally valid?”102  
Thus, in general, nationalism commonly is an idea based on nation-state, self-
determination, national identity, territorial autonomy, sovereignty or national 
superiority. In this context, nationalism defines the territorial boundaries that would be 
controlled by the nation and it defines the criteria for the membership of a nation.103  
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 1.2) Ethnic and Civic Nationalism 
 
The definition of nation is pathological simply because while any definition 
legitimates certain claims, it at the same time delegitimates others.104 On this ground, 
German and French understanding of nation might be helpful in clarifying this 
statement. According to Rogers Brubaker, German and France models are two ideal-
typical models of citizenship in Europe. In Germany, the notion of “nation” (blood) 
preceded the notion of “state” (soil). However, in France, the picture was the other way 
round. Accordingly, a German nation had already existed in ethnic terms. So, the 
unification of Germany in 1871 did not create Germans but a German nation founded a 
state. However before 1871, they were governed by different states such as Austria, 
Prussia or Russia. Therefore, if a person carried a German blood he could then claim to 
be German regardless of his residence. France, on the other hand, was a state before it 
was a nation. It was the transformation of dynastic state into people’s state that created 
French nation. Accordingly, peasants had been turned into Frenchmen by the state 
roughly in nineteenth century.105 In other words, types of nationalism in these countries 
are determined by whether the national identity feeling emerged before or after the 
foundation of a nation-state. National feeling in France has occurred after the 
establishment of French nation-state. So, it is an example of civic nationalism. 
However, national feeling in Germany preceded the establishment of the German 
nation-state. So, the foundation of German state was an ethnocultural development 
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rather than a political one.106  French society is politically bound and they define 
national membership politically through formal citizenship methods. On the other side, 
German society is ethnically bound and national membership is defined according to 
blood ties.107  
Therefore, the definition of nation in more civic ties might delegitimate an ethnic 
definition of nation and vice versa. In addition, this situation in long term caused 
different policies in these countries: 
 
The state-centred assimilationist understanding of nationhood in France is embodied and 
expressed in an expansive definition of citizenship, one that automatically transforms 
second-generation immigrants into citizens, assimilating them – legally – to other French 
men and women. The ethnocultural, differentialist understanding of nationhood in 
Germany is embodied and expressed in a definition of citizenship that is remarkably open 
to ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but remarkably 
closed to non-German immigrants.108  
 
In parallel with this, Ernst Renan emphasizes the civility of the nation once again. 
Accordingly, in 1882, Renan demanded the return of Alsace to France in accordance 
with the free choice of the province’s population regardless of their language or blood 
precisely because in the German Romantic tradition the nation was an organic 
community. However, Renan stated that the nation is a voluntary community, a daily 
plebiscite: “[m]an is the slave neither of his race, his language, nor his religion; neither 
of the courses of the rivers, nor the mountain ranges. One great aggregate of men, of 
sound spirit and warm heart, creates a moral conscience that is called a nation.”109 So, 
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Renan distinguished “those nations (such as France) that are the result of the free 
choices of their members from those (such as Germany) whose identity and cohesion 
are given to their members independently of any voluntary will.”110  
In that sense, ethnic nationalism111 defines the nation on the base of blood or 
ethnicity. Therefore, it is quite exclusionary. So, while civic nationalism sees the nation 
as a voluntary association and a daily plebiscite, ethnic nationalism sees it as a 
community of fate. In this sense, civic nationalism is identified with liberalism but 
ethnic nationalism is identified with authoritarian regimes and historically became 
dominant in Central and Eastern Europe.112 However, French and American 
nationalisms are traditionally regarded as civic nationalism. These societies fought for 
the sovereignty of the people. So, community membership is defined in political terms 
and civic virtues became more important than common culture or even ethnicity. 
Territorial boundaries were the only means of exclusion. Therefore, anybody having the 
civic virtues can become French or American citizen. 
On the other hand, although civic nationalists have an antipathy to bureaucratic 
state just like ethnic nationalists have, their raison d’étre is a bit different. Their ideal is 
a citizenship community that lives under the common laws irrespective of their cultures. 
So they have conflict with any existing state preventing these ideals. However, since the 
world population is divided into states they have to work within these particular 
political units. In that sense, their aim is to secure this state to realize their ideals. But, 
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what is paradoxical here is that civic nationalists may be forced to adopt ethnic-
historical identities to mobilize people in favor of their ideals and in the end their 
policies can be ethnicized. Nonetheless, their ideals are modernist since they defend a 
representative state that will enable equal participation to all citizens.113 Unlike civic 
nationalists, for ethnic nationalists, nation is primordial and natural.114 Therefore, it is 
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in community imagination. Accordingly, nationalism depended heavily on the 
integration of distinctive dialects into new common languages and print technology and 
capitalism facilitated this process as providing a new fixity and a stable grammar to the 
language. On the other hand, according to primordialist approach, the roots of the nation 
are very old and nations have always been in existence. People are bound their nationals 
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kinship, blood or customs. So, there is continuity between ancient and modern concept 
of nation. Ethno-symbolist approach, on this ground, is a midway in between modernist 
and primordial approach. It is a midway because Anthony Smith, like primordialists, 
has explained that the roots of nationalism have lied in pre-modern ethnicity but like 
modernists he also accepted that nations are somehow constructed. However, this is not 
an arbitrary invention. Nations take their powers from the myths, traditions or symbols 
of ethnic life and once these myths, symbols or values are formed they then tend to 
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organic and a passion rooted in nature and history rather than mere political units and so 
nation should be cherished by the members of it. Nevertheless, they respect the division 
within the nation such as sexual, religious or regional one since this differentiation 
enables for national creativity. However, to consolidate this creativity ethnic nationalists 
seek a moral regeneration by re-uniting the different aspects of the nation in between 
traditional and modern, agriculture and industry, science and religion.115  
The politics of two nationalisms also differ from each other. The basic objective 
of civic nationalists is the achievement of a representative national state. This is vital 
because only a representative state could guarantee certain citizenship rights to its 
members. So, they mobilize people against the existing state that is perceived as neither 
representative nor egalitarian. However, ethnic nationalists emphasize the importance of 
culture rather than the state simply because “[t]he glory of a country comes not from its 
political power but from the culture of its people…”116 Therefore, ethnic nationalists 
aim to consolidate and re-create their particular national civilization. According to them, 
although it is possible to construct a state from above, it is not in the case of civilization 
simply because it is a spontaneous social order and can only aroused from the bottom. 
Accordingly, the established decentralized cultural societies, associations or journals 
provide complimentary love of community to their members by teaching them their 
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common splendor and suffering. For that aim, they engage in rituals and cultural 
celebrations but reject foreign practices. Nonetheless, they are not totally hostile to 
independent statehood in practice precisely because they need state tools to provide 
cultural autonomy. 117   
At this point, according to Hans Kohn, once a nation state is founded there occurs 
two types of nationalism: either civic or ethnic. While the former is more rational the 
latter is more mystical. On the other hand, the socio-political development of a society 
determines whether this society will be civic or ethnic nationalist.118 Accordingly, civic 
nationalism has first arisen in the Western Europe and the USA. These were the 
communities where a developed culture and a sophisticated urban middle-class molded 
with Renaissance existed. Therefore, the only thing they aimed during the emergence of 
nationalism was to transform the existing state into people’s state. In other words, 
nationalism gained a constitutional form in these societies and became more rationalist 
and pluralist. However, when nationalism arose in the East, namely Central and Eastern 
Europe and Asia, it turned into a reactive nationalism and conflicted with the existing 
state model. But, unlike in the West, their intention was not to transform it into a 
people’s state “(…)but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with 
ethnographic demands.”119 Here, the vast majority of the population was agrarian 
dominated by an aristocracy and intelligentsia, so there was no such a secular middle 
class in these communities. Moreover, nationalists in the East were aware of their 
backward social and political culture in comparison to the West and unable to identify a 
community within the concrete territory. Thus, they created an imaginary nation based 
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on historical memories and culture. So, unlike civic definition of nationalism in the 
West, they claimed ethnic, mystic and organic link between peasant, land and 
community. Thus, nationalism in the East became more emotional and authoritarian. In 
that sense, while ethnic nationalism in the East regarded the myths of the past without 
too many connections with the present, civic nationalism in the West struggled with 
present without too much emphasizing the past..120
   
1.3) Liberal Nationalism 
 
Postwar liberal philosophers opposed nationalism simply because they feared that 
using the state in favor of a certain ethnic or national project would cause brutal 
conflict. In 1970s, for example, neo-Kantian approach stated that state should remain 
neutral and must not be used in favor of certain religious, ethnic or cultural agendas. 
This doctrine of state neutrality derives from the liberal idea in which individuals from 
different religious, ethnic and cultural groups could live peacefully together, under a 
political institution that they see as legitimate.121 However, in time, liberals came to 
realize that political institutions cannot be separated from culture as in the case of 
religion. So they concluded that neither the nation nor political institutions can be 
totally culturally neutral, but what is important is to protect plurality of the society.122
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In this context, Yael Tamir argues that it is possible to alleviate some of the 
problems of culturally or ethnically diverse societies. For that aim, for instance, “public 
sphere in which a nation’s culture is expressed (nationality) from the political 
institutions in which all citizens participate (citizenship)” must be distinguished from 
each other. So, according to her, although we cannot provide each nation their own 
state, to prevent the alienation of minorities we can still guarantee them a public sphere 
in which national culture of minorities is expressed.123 Because, if culture is something 
that holds a nation together and keeps it distinct from others, then the existence of a 
nation as a separate unit depends on the presence of a public sphere in which the 
national culture is expressed.124  
It is for these reasons that intellectuals have developed liberal nationalism. 
Mainly, liberal nationalism has two claims: (a) nationalism is functionally vital for the 
viability of liberal democracy simply because it is necessary for social integration; and 
(b) certain forms of nationalism are compatible with liberal democratic norms.125 
Accordingly, a liberal democratic society can provide social integration democratically 
as long as its citizens are unified by a shared nationality and national culture. On this 
ground, this integration must be nationalist integration.126 But on the other hand, 
individual rights are the main core of liberal nationalism. So, to liberal nationalists, all 
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nations should enjoy equal rights simply because “national rights rest on the value that 
individuals attach to their membership in a nation.”127  
Hence, liberal nationalism is a composite of liberalism and nationalism and it 
combines personal autonomy with communal belonging and sees them as 
complementary rather than conflicting.128 In other words, it derives from two schools of 
thoughts. From liberalism, firstly, it commits to personal autonomy and individual 
rights which mean in the end the right of individuals to choose their national identity; 
and from nationalism, secondly, it appreciates the importance of communal membership 
in human life which means the right to attach to the national culture of individual 
choice.129 Accordingly, individuals are social animals and the membership of a society 
is a constitutive element of personal identity130 and society is necessary to provide 
individuals self-development, self-expression, and satisfaction.131  
Therefore, liberals celebrate the plurality of thoughts, desires and beliefs. 
Regarding the personal identity, nationalists explain that the only way in which 
individuals can realize themselves is their identification with a certain nation. Since 
nationalists perceive societies as natural organs, “the social whole is therefore seen as 
prior to, more important, and greater than all its parts.” Nevertheless, for liberals, 
individual diversity is the main core of the organic view of society.132 So, Tamir reaches 
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the conclusion that “liberals need not reject the importance of cultural contextualization, 
whereas nationalists need not ignore the importance of personal freedom.”133  
In addition, individuals will only be able to exercise their right to make cultural 
choices as long as the plurality of cultures is protected.134 Cultural plurality is important 
simply because individuals “are like artists and writers who pick up elements of one 
another’s style, or even borrow plots, not for the sake of imitation but in order to 
strengthen their own work.”135 At this point, the right to culture means to allow 
individuals to choose the culture they would like to live within. So, liberal nationalism 
acknowledges that culture and membership are communal features. In other words, they 
are fully enjoyed only together with others who made similar choices. Thus, the right to 
culture necessitates the right to a public sphere in which individuals can share a 
common language, folk or memory.136
On the other hand, according to Tamir, cultural affiliations should be respected. 
For example, if a company employs Muslim or Jews workers, it should assure other 
foods than pork at the company’s restaurant. But it does not have to assure Japanese 
food for those workers who love it.137 Thus, the right to culture is not ultimate and the 
freedom of one culture ends at where the freedom of other culture begins.138  
In addition, she also argues that individuals have some obligations to the state, 
supposed that state is just, to which they belong. On this ground, “individuals assume 
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such obligations because they see the state as their state, its laws as their laws, and its 
government as their government.”139
In short, the entire aim of liberal nationalism, says Tamir, is to assure minorities 
an opportunity to live together with the majority and to protect their cultural, religious, 
and linguistic identities:140
     Liberal nationalism thus celebrates the particularity of culture together with the 
universality of human rights, the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals together 
with their personal autonomy. In this sense it differs radically from organic interpretations 
of nationalism, which assume that the identity of individuals is totally constituted by their 
national membership...141
      
Hence, if all nation-states were homogeneous then liberal nationalism would pose 
no problems simply because the society would have a homogeneous culture and there 
would be no need to respect other cultures. However most of the states are culturally or 
ethnically diverse and the advancement of a certain nation to the detriment of other 
nations renders harsh implications for members of minority groups. Therefore, liberal 
nationalism entails a certain degree of tolerance, open-mindedness, and common 
sense.142 So, according to liberal nationalism, nationalism can be more pluralistic and 
less ethnocentric.143 In other words, individuals can make national choices. It means that 
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‘I would like to be French’ is meaningful and different from the statement ‘I am French’ 
or ‘I feel French’.144  
      
2) The Formation of Dutch Nationalism 
 
On the aforementioned theoretical ground, it is worth to explain theoretically that 
how and under which conditions the Dutch nationalism occurred. In that sense, in order 
to find the nationalist bases in a certain country, one needs to study the history of that 
nation due to the fact that history accommodates very clear clues about that country. For 
instance, the reasons of ethnic nationalism in the pre-war Germany could not have been 
understood without studying early German history. In that sense, as it has been 
discussed before, the history of this country shows that a common German identity had 
arisen before the modern state penetration. In other words, prior to state apparatus, there 
have been already a national consciousness and this was one of the most important 
reasons for the fact that why a stronger nationalism had found a chance to live in 
Germany. On this ground, the same mentality should be followed: the history of the 
Netherlands can provide very important clues on Dutch nationalism. Thus, this part will 
discuss the creation process of a Dutch identity and will theoretically evaluate the 
consequences of it.   
The current territory that is today called as “The Netherlands” was inhabited by 
Germanic and Celtic tribes, i.e. Frisians, Saxons, and Franks, and later became one of 
the provinces of Roman Empire till the 5th century. After the dissolution of Roman 
Empire, on the other hand, the country consisted of various countships, duchies and 
dioceses belonging to the Holy Roman Empire. However, under Habsburg rule, these 
                                                 
144 Ibid., p.26. 
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separate feudal entities of the territory had been united into one state by Charles V in 
the 16th century. Nevertheless, there was uneasiness for the religious restrictions and 
absolutist ruling of Charles V’s son, King Philip of Spain at that time. Indeed, after the 
spread of Christian reformation especially to the Western Europe, many people in the 
Netherlands immediately adopted Christian Protestantism simply because they were 
under the suppress of Roman Catholic Habsburgs. So, they willingly embraced a new 
Christian sect protesting Roman Catholicism. However, this situation eventually 
increased Habsburgs’ religious suppress on Protestants. On the other hand, there were 
still quite considerable Catholics settling especially at the southern part of the country. 
Naturally, in comparison to Protestants, these Catholics were not abused by Habsburgs’ 
religious suppress. In other words, Catholics did not complain about the Habsburg yoke 
as much as Protestants did. Therefore, there was not only a religious but also political 
clash between these two communities. Nevertheless, the aforementioned Habsburg yoke 
caused a revolt under Prince William of Orange started in 1568 and ended in 1648 with 
the Peace of Westphalia. With this treaty, Spain recognized the Netherlands as an 
independent state under the name of the Republic of the United Provinces. Accordingly, 
the new state had consisted of seven sovereign provinces of Utrecht, Groningen, 
Gelderland, Zeeland, Friesland, Overijssel and Holland.145   
In that sense, the religion was the primary cleavage in Dutch history. It was the 
Protestant subjects’ revolt against the Catholic Spanish King that created the Dutch 
Republic. Calvinism, on the other hand, became a dominant sect very early in the Dutch 
Protestantism. So, the political elites of the new Republic were mainly Calvinist. 
Although other religious groups such as Protestant dissenters, Roman Catholics or Jews 
                                                 
145 See Blom, J. C. H. and Lamberts, E. History of the Low Countries. Berghahn Books, 
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had freedom of conscience, they did not have the same public rights in comparison to 
Calvinist citizens. For example, one had to be member of the Calvinist Church in order 
to be employed as a teacher or a civil servant. In addition, a Catholic province had been 
governed by a Calvinist Staten-Generaal. For that reason, the new state was not 
legitimate enough among Catholics or Protestant dissenters. So their orientation to the 
Dutch Republic was low and a Dutch conscious and identity was very limited at the 
period of Republic of the United Provinces.146
At the same time, The Republic of the United Provinces had a decentralized 
structure. In terms of their decisions, cities and localities were autonomous. Apart from 
religious matters, Dutch Reformed Church147 also ruled in education, poverty relief or 
marriage. But other religious groups such as Lutherans, Catholics or Jews were 
discriminated and not allowed to be employed in government. In that sense, they were 
second-class citizens. Therefore, southerners with their high Roman Catholic 
population, for example, did not have any emotional attachments towards the state just 
because it was associated with Protestantism. 
In this context, it is clear that especially non-Protestant communities in the 
Netherlands have not felt Dutch or think nationally in the 19th century, yet. The official 
discrimination against these people, on the other hand, was the main reason behind this 
non-allegiance. Nonetheless, Napoleonic invasions and modernization process started in 
the 19th century have changed people’s approach to the concept of nation in the 
Netherlands. 
                                                 
146 Knippenberg, Hans. Dutch nation-building: a struggle against the water?. Geo-
Journal, Vol. 43, No.1, 1997, pp. 29-30. 
 
147 Dutch Reformed Church is a historical Protestant denomination based on the 
doctrines of John Calvin. Historically, the foundation of the Reformed Church goes 
back to the Dutch Revolt. Accordingly, the declaration of religious independence from 
Rome followed the declaration of political independence from Spain.  
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In that sense, the French arrival to the Netherlands in 1795 ended the old federal 
Republic and after the foundation of the Batavian Republic148 in the same year, the 
Netherlands became a French style centralized nation-state. In other words, after their 
withdrawal in 1813, French left behind the basis of a centralized state structure in the 
Netherlands. That meant that the all citizens, Calvinist, Catholics and the others, got the 
same rights derived from the idea of sovereignty of the people.149 Therefore, the new 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was founded on equal citizenship principle in 1815. 
Eventually, the aforementioned legal discrimination of these groups had been officially 
ended by the new centralized state. This situation, on the other hand, necessitated the re-
definition of the nation based on an equal citizenry. Therefore, this was the clear 
introduction of civic nationalism into the country.  
Indeed, according to Kohn, the Netherlands, apart from Great Britain, France, 
United States, and Switzerland was one of the countries that civic nationalism had first 
arisen in it. That meant that, after the foundation of Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch 
nation became a voluntary association and a citizens community with equal rights and 
duties. In this context, irrespective of their religious or ethnic backgrounds, every 
people in the Netherlands could freely join the Dutch nation providing that they submit 
their allegiance to the newly founded state. In this sense, membership for the nation was 
not fixed on the ground of religion or ethnicity. On the contrary, after the foundation of 
                                                 
148 After the French Revolution, the Netherlands was occupied by French revolutionary 
forces in 1795 and the Batavian Republic which made the country a vassal state of 
France had been founded. In 1806, Napoleon declared his brother Louis Bonaparte as 
the king of the Kingdom of Holland , a new title of the Netherlands and just four years 
later it was annexed by France. Following the collapse of French Empire, the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands consisting of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg was formed in 
1815. However, first Belgium in 1830 and then Luxembourg in 1890 left the Kingdom 
and gained their independence. 
 
149 Knippenberg (1997), op.cit., p.30. 
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the Kingdom of the Netherlands, people in this country, from then on, were a 
community of citizens held together by common principles.150  
Nonetheless, legal discrimination of non-Protestant religious groups had been 
officially ended and “nation” was re-defined by more civic terms by the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands simply because the aim of new Kingdom was to create an undivided 
Christian nation. Accordingly, it would marginalize religious differences by moving 
them from public sphere to the private sphere. The ban of the reading of Bible in 
schools was a good example for this policy. By this way, the Kingdom intended to 
consolidate the unity of the people of the Netherlands.151 So, for example, two 
ministries responsible for religious affairs, a Ministry for Protestant worship and a 
Ministry for Roman Catholic worship, had been introduced in 1815. The main motive 
was still to control religious groups and to facilitate the creation of undivided, general 
Christian nation. However, as Knippenberg stated, “State efforts to keep the religious 
diversity out of the public sphere had an inverted impact. The result was a stronger self-
consciousness of Orthodox-Protestants and Roman Catholics...”152 Accordingly, the 
undivided Christian nation understanding contrarily strengthened the consciousness of 
religious difference in Dutch society. The more religious groups were marginalized the 
more religious conscious they became. In other words, it was the same state 
encouraging territorial integration on the one hand and stimulating religious division on 
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the other hand. But, as it was noted above, this was not a result of purposive policy. The 
real aim was to provide Dutch unity.153   
Prior to the 19th century, there was not a clear-cut Dutch consciousness. On the 
contrary, in comparison to non-Protestant communities, the Dutch state, the Republic of 
the United Provinces, favored Protestant communities. However, spread of the French 
Revolution principles by Napoleonic invasions inverted the picture in the Netherlands. 
Accordingly, the impact of French invasion on Dutch policy was the foundation of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands based on equal citizens community. The main motive 
behind this policy was to provide Dutch unity. Nonetheless, French invasions 
introduced common principles that would hold people together in the society. As a 
result, people in the Netherlands began to attach their allegiances to the Dutch state and 
to the Dutch “nation”. 
In this context, as it was noted before, state formation precedes nation-building in 
the civic nationalism. However, in ethnic nationalism, a nation already exists and this 
ethnic nation struggles for the formation of a new state as in the case of Habsburg or 
Ottoman Empire.154 In other words, while “ethnicization of the polity” occurs in the 
civic nationalism, “the politicization of ethnicity” occurs in the ethnic nationalism.155  
In that sense, since the formation of Dutch state preceded the Dutch nation-
building, civic nationalism was dominant in the Netherlands. Indeed, nation-building 
process only started after the Dutch state had been formed at the end of the 17th century. 
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Accordingly, before the foundation of Dutch state, the unifying force of the Calvinist 
Church and cultural domination of the province of Holland were dominant, but a Dutch 
consciousness was too limited. However, after the foundation of the Dutch states, first 
the Republic of the United Provinces and then the Kingdom of the Netherlands, cultural 
homogenization and what Karl Deutsch calls “social mobilization”156 of the Dutch 
people have started and up to now, the development of a common national culture and 
the replacement of the Calvinist Church by the Dutch state as the strongest unifying 
force have occurred.  
At the same time, since it recognizes people’s right to choose their nationals and 
accepts those who come from different subcultures but unite under the same citizenship 
roof, civic nationalism is liberal. However, as it was touched upon before, irrespective 
of individual free will, membership of a specific community in ethnic nationalism is 
described by birth. Thus, it is seen as illiberal.157 In this sense, since the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands was founded on equal citizenship principle and accepted those who come 
from different subcultures, the country seems once again liberal.   
According to Renze Portengen, in comparison to neighboring countries, there is 
no strict language or ethnic demarcation in the Netherlands. Rather, it is more concrete 
to speak of Protestant and Catholic areas.158 Historically, this demarcation goes back to 
the spread of Calvinism in the country in the 16th century and became a symbol during 
the Dutch revolt against the Catholic Spain in Eighty Years War started in 1568. In this 
context, religious demarcation of the Netherlands strongly affected social, cultural and 
                                                 
156 See Deutsch, Karl. Nationalism and social communication: An inquiry into the 
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Vol.5, No.2, 1999, pp.288-9. 
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political life in that country. Indeed, the Dutch nationalism is a clear by product of this 
demarcation. Since Catholicism was identified with Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg 
dynasty, after their independence, Republic of the United Provinces would be very 
pleased to have loyal Protestant subjects. Therefore, there was an official discrimination 
of the Catholics in the new Republic. As a result, Catholics were those who had the 
lowest “Dutch” feelings. However, when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was founded 
on the principle of sovereignty of the people in the 19th century, it adopted all religions 
with equal rights policy. According to this idea, the Kingdom marginalized religious 
differences by moving them from public sphere to the private sphere. The intention was 
to create an undivided Christian nation. In the end, a Dutch identity among the 
Protestant and Catholic communities had arisen. Theoretically, since the formation of 
Dutch state preceded the Dutch nation-building, it is more concrete to find civic 
nationalist ties in that country. In addition, due to the fact that the plurality of the 
subcultures is respected and protected through certain autonomies of the pillar systems, 
liberal nationalist sentiments are also clear. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Political Structure in the Netherlands: The Pillar System 
 
The Netherlands is a typical plural society159 with its clear-cut subcultural 
segments. However, social segmentation causes certain cleavages in plural societies. 
Indeed, in the Netherlands, the aforementioned Catholic and Protestant cleavages on the 
religious discrimination and on the Protestant definition of citizenship during the 
Republic of United Provinces were grand cleavages between these two communities. 
Therefore, according to Lijphart, the Dutch invented consociational democracy simply 
because they had to learn to live together with acute differences. In this context, 
consociational democracy and elites try to neutralize the destabilizing effect of social 
segmentation through compromise. In other words, the role of social elites and their 
agreement and co-operation are needed for a stable democracy.160  
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Indeed, when Arend Lijphart introduced his famous consociational democracy 
concept in the late sixties his aim was to explain political stability in plural societies. In 
that sense, the elite behavior was the starting point in his analysis of plural societies. 
Accordingly, Lijphart says that “[b]oth the explanatory and predictive power of the 
consociational model can be improved (...)by identifying the conditions that are 
conducive to overarching elite cooperation and stable nonelite support.”161 Thanks to 
“overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting 
disintegrative tendencies in the system” the Netherlands besides Switzerland, Austria 
and Belgium succeeded consociational democracy that provided “a self-negating 
prediction or prophecy.”162
In this context, since the elites of socially fragmented bodies of society such as 
confessional party leaders realized the dangers endemic to religious and social 
cleavages, they preferred to compromise in favor of the masses. Lijphart names this 
situation as a politics of accommodation at the elite level. Accordingly, cooperation 
within the government was one of the most influential ways in providing political 
stability in the socially fragmented Netherlands. At this point, a current and a good 
example of cooperation in Dutch society is proportional representation system simply 
because it favors minority rather than majority and thus opens the doors for coalitional 
governments. This is very critical because it provides high legitimacy of the rules and 
decisions emerged from these cooperation and coalitions. Therefore, coalition 
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governments are the most important means of consociational democracy.163 In that 
sense, since it was necessary for the continuous presence of religious and social groups 
in the country, proportional representation had been introduced in 1917. As a result, 
Dutch coalition politics had emerged. This emergence is very important precisely 
because “the formation of governments is not only about the question of which parties 
will join, but it also involves negotiations on policies” (italics added). In other words, 
the compulsory outcomes of these negotiations are compromise and consensus.164  
Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that this system is perfect. For example, the 
involvement of too many segments of society into the policy-making process generally 
results with convoluted compromises and causes gedogen (‘to tolerate’). It means that 
“the law is strict, so as to satisfy opponents of a particular practise, but it is not always 
applied, so as to satisfy its proponents.” In other words, while the state has certain 
regulations and rules, it officially tolerates people to deviate from these rules. For 
instance, the law forbids abortion except in emergency but it is tolerated for the first 
twenty-four weeks in practice; or the law does not allow the selling of drugs but the 
selling of soft drugs in coffee shops are officially tolerated.165 In this context, toleration 
is an inevitable consequence of the consociational democracy.166 
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On this ground, the Netherlands is a good example of consociational democracy 
in the world history precisely because although it had deep social divisions inside, the 
Dutch succeeded to neutralize the destabilizing effects of them. Therefore, Lijphart’s 
model of consociational democracy had explained the political stability in a deeply 
fragmented society. Accordingly, the severe clashes among the religious groups and 
social classes made political leaders notice that there was no way other than cooperation 
to maintain peace.167 Thus, stability is provided simply because the elites of the pillars, 
the fragmented subcultures, pragmatically cooperated and so reached certain 
compromises. So, the leaders of the social segments and the cooperation among them 
are vital in consociational democracy.168  
In that sense, it is possible to originate Lijphart’s consociational democracy to 
Dutch pillar system.169 The term is used to stress the religious segmentation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
live in peace together.  On this ground, elites of the society do not follow policies that a 
certain homogenous culture is emphasized precisely because such a policy may damage 
the cooperation between different cultures. Therefore, a moderate nationalism is typical 
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from 1650 onwards, Dutch society had been already subdivided into subcultural namely 
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Calvinist, historically originated. See Kickert, op.cit., p.136. 
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country. In this context, regarding the Catholic/Protestant cleavage in the Netherlands, 
the pillar system had emerged due to the need for consensus-building in social and 
political life. For that aim, in political system, a lot of autonomies in labor relations, 
education or religious activities were given to each zuil (pillar) and so the pillar system 
maintained the politics of accommodation in Dutch society. In this context, according to 
many scholars, Dutch society performed the pillar system’s most developed form 
between 1910s and 1960s. At this period, many people lived big part of their lives 
within one of the three pillars: Roman Catholic, Calvinist (Protestant) or secular 
(socialists or liberals).170 However, as it will be seen below, this system began to lose its 
importance after the 1960’s especially because of dechristianization and the rise of 
welfare state. Nonetheless, it is still a model especially for the integration of immigrants 
into Dutch society.171
Historically, religious line organizations of Dutch society had weakened the class 
struggle from the late 19th century precisely because they united different people from 
different social classes. These religious line organizations were typical political interest 
groups and called verzuiling (pillarization). In addition, verzuiling heavily consisted of 
compliance with elite control and confessional solidarity. Accordingly, it is a system in 
which the major religious sects are vertically organized and so each citizen can find 
his/her position in accordance with his/her sect in these voluntary organizations. 
Catholic/Protestant youth organizations, trade unions, universities, media, sports clubs, 
homes for the elderly and hospitals can be counted as an example. Therefore, people are 
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secluded according to their pillar and have little relations with members of other pillars 
in this system. In that sense, Catholics and Calvinists had strong pillars while liberals 
and socialists had not. Indeed, H. L. Wesseling defines verzuiling as the religious 
segmentation of Dutch society.172 Therefore, the core of pillar system is the existence of 
different religious groups, namely Catholics and Protestants, in the Dutch society. In 
other words, socialist or liberal pillars have been included into the system much later. 
For example, in an economic daily life, people might prefer to shop in the markets 
whose owners share the same sect with them. However, liberals and socialists have 
recently engaged in “neutral” organizations just like in the case of neutral (state) 
universities.173  
Education is the most dominant part of the pillar system. Accordingly, after the 
foundation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the public schools gained a modern 
character and forbade any religious dogmatism precisely because the education policy 
of the new Kingdom was to create undivided, general Christian nation. Nevertheless, 
Orthodox-Protestants complained about the public schools so that it was not religious 
enough. Furthermore, for Roman Catholics, public schools were still too Protestant in 
nature since they forbade the reading of Bible in schools, for example. Therefore, they 
both struggled for founding their free denominational schools. Under these conditions, 
the international revolutionary atmosphere of 1848 pressured King William II to sign a 
liberal and a modern constitution in 1848. With this constitution, freedom of education 
and of religion had been declared. In other words, Protestants and Catholics were then 
able to found their confessional private schools. However, since confessional private 
schools  did not get any State aid in comparison to public schools, Protestants and 
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Catholics still struggled for financial rights of confessional private education. In the 
end, this right had also been declared with 1917 Pacification.174  
Pillarization system, therefore, is somehow the acceptance of hierarchical body of 
the pillars such as the obedience of the majority of people to the directives of pillars’ 
leaders. As Jan Berting stated, “the major orientation of the population in political 
matters has been described as being one that is characterized by compliance to the 
wishes of the leaders and to the system’s rules.”175  Nevertheless, the hierarchy in the 
pillars is not an undemocratic tie but is there to protect the weak. D’Iribarne says that 
the hierarchy in large organizations exists in all societies he analyzed except in the 
Netherlands. In the Dutch case, the tasks of these echelons are to listen and guide the 
workers, for example. If a worker makes mistakes in executing his task he is not blamed 
but his superior supervisor is blamed since he neglects to teach or supervise the 
worker.176     
There are certain ways to eliminate the cultural minorities and differences in a 
society. Accordingly, minorities can be suppressed and assimilated or cultural 
differences are marginalized and institutionalized by the state. In that sense, diversities 
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are moved to the private sphere. The latter is the case in the Netherlands. As it was 
mentioned above, at first, the Republic of the United Provinces emphasized the 
Christian Protestantism and then the Kingdom of the Netherlands intended to create an 
undivided Christian nation. That meant that the Dutch government tried to eliminate the 
other religious groups from the public sphere in the 18th and 19th century. As a result, 
these differences have increasingly been institutionalized. At this period, the country 
was divided into three religious groups and so pillars: Orthodox Protestants177, the 
Liberal Protestants (including atheists/socialists) and Roman Catholics. Since they 
concentrate in different regions these religious groups were segregated from each other. 
Besides, because of this segregation, there were minimal contacts between the members 
of the three pillars. On the other hand, social control on the private life is provided by 
the pillarized organizations dealing with politics, media, education, unions, leisure-time 
activities and healthcare. By this way, internal communication in the pillars was 
improved while the individual contacts between the members of the other pillars were 
minimized. So, consciousness of religious and cultural differences were high and it was 
only the elites of the pillars making compromise on a national level to be able to 
cooperate precisely because they were national institutions and they could change their 
members’ orientations. Consequently, the pillarization had marginalized the cultural and 
                                                 
177 When the liberal Calvinist wanted to open the church for all Christians, many 
orthodox Calvinists thought that the Church was too liberal and so decided to split of 
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religious differences and so provided a relative peace in favor of the minorities in the 
Dutch society.178  
Indeed, pillarization had a special meaning for Catholic minorities. Accordingly, 
the Dutch revolt against the Spain was also a Protestant revolt against Roman 
Catholicism. The economic base of the country, namely Holland, was strongly opposed 
to the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, till 19th century, the only officially 
acknowledged church was the Dutch Reformed Church and after the separation of 
Belgium and the Netherlands in 1830, Dutch Catholics became a typical minority. On 
the other hand, the orthodox Calvinists were not pleased with the Reformed Church 
since the latter is too “modernist” and “liberal”.  
At this point, it was the pillar system that created a living space for these 
Catholics and Calvinists (or neo-Calvinist as generally called): 
Through their own schools, universities, media, unions, sports and leisure clubs, and above 
all their own political parties (the Roman Catholic People’s Party and the Anti-
Revolutionary Party), and through a clerically supervised endogamy and demographic 
policy, Dutch Catholics and Neo-Calvinists were forged into coherent, visible, 
demographically significant and increasingly powerful segments of Dutch society and 
culture. Pillarization, in other words, was the main road to Catholic and Neo-Calvinist 
(“gereformeerde”) emancipation.179   
      
However, it does not mean that there are three different Dutch nations. Rather, 
only one Dutch nation was built. Accordingly, while pillarization had integrated 
Protestants and Catholics in their own pillar, it at the same time integrated them in the 
national community. Men were not only Catholic or Protestant but a Dutch Catholic and 
a Dutch Protestant. Again, education played a very critical role in this process. 
Although education in confessional schools was different from the public schools, 
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standard Dutch language, Dutch geography or Dutch history were still frames of 
reference.180
Nevertheless, after the World War II, the pillar system began to be questioned. 
Accordingly, at the post-war period, the aim was renewal rather than recovery and for 
that aim, the old type of verzuiling had to disappear and a new society based on equality 
and liberty should be constructed. Therefore, in the 1960s, accepting the pillars’ control 
unquestioningly were no more the case for many Dutch people. The demands for 
liberalization and democratization were grand challenges in this process.181 In other 
words, during the reconstruction period of the Netherlands, The Dutch believed that a 
physical and a material reconstruction was not enough but a socio-cultural and a moral 
one were also needed simply because the pillars had lost most of their influence during 
the German occupation. At this point, it was questioned whether the pillar system would 
maintain its function and value on a post-war society in which all economic and social 
forces were needed to be pulled together to re-build the society. Under these conditions, 
the Dutch nation was called to break the confinements of their pillars by certain 
ideological groups. However, only a little group of Catholics and Protestants abandoned 
their confinements and joined either Socialist or the Liberal Parties. Nonetheless, in the 
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1950s, the Netherlands was still a pillarized country. However, two main factors have 
interrupted the pillar system. First, the post-war harmony created between employers, 
workers and politicians began to be questioned by workers in the 1960s. Accordingly, 
concerning the devastating conditions of post-war period, this harmony kept wages 
relatively low but provided high level of employment. Nevertheless, the Dutch workers 
who were paid lesser than the other workers in the surrounding countries demanded 
better working conditions and higher wages at the beginning of the 1960s. Second, a 
new generation who did not witness the two World wars and the Great Depression had 
arisen. They grew up in better conditions than their families had. For instance, they 
were educated better, gained an international outlook due to the newly presented 
television and the increasing geographical mobility. These new middle-class students in 
universities felt uncomfortable about the authoritarian confinements of the pillar system. 
In short, the huge economic and social inequalities of post-war society had to be thrown 
away. “The post-war society should be a society of social justice and of social security 
for which the state would be the major guarantor, although in close cooperation with 
societal organizations and the market.”182  
In addition, thanks to their autonomy vis-à-vis the state the pillarized 
organizations had executed the so-called social welfare tasks in the pre-war period. The 
pillarized organizations such as schools, housing corporations or hospitals strongly 
operated charity campaigns during the war. However, when the welfare state project 
had been introduced roughly in 1960, all balances in the pillar system have changed in 
favor of the state simply because a state rather than the pillar organizations penetrating 
all parts of the social and economic life had been projected. In other words, after the 
construction of the Dutch welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, the government rapidly 
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began to penetrate all parts of the daily life. Accordingly, this process resulted with the 
loss of autonomy to the detriment of pillarized institutions precisely because it was the 
time of top-down government planning then. At first, the juridical system in social 
security law had been introduced and then government engagement into certain social 
policy sectors such as health, housing, education and welfare had been provided by 
center planning.183 For that reason, one must take this turning point in the Dutch history 
into account to understand the transformation of the pillar system in the Netherlands in 
the 1960s. Accordingly, although they still kept their de jure autonomies, the pillarized 
organizations began to lose their prior de facto autonomies vis-à-vis the state. They 
were now heavily dependent on state subsidies and were subject to state regulations and 
bureaucracy. At the same time, increasing class consciousness in the 1960s got the 
Dutch workers in the welfare state organized under the professional organizations. In 
this way, they have not directed their orientation to their pillars any more but to the state 
and certain bureaucrats precisely because “it was from them that they could expect the 
defence of their rights and interests and, it was from them that they could receive power 
and influence.” So, the pillarized organizations became more dependent on state and 
bureaucrats as long as welfare state workers got professionalized.184
Nonetheless, a strong central government control was still a new concept for the 
Dutch people precisely because for centuries central state had not existed or remained 
relatively small in the Netherlands. Indeed, according to Catholic and Protestant 
communities, state interference to societal affairs should be limited. Therefore, 
Catholics introduced subsidiarity principle. That means that “higher instance cannot 
take over a task that a lower instance can fulfil.” In other words, the state that is a higher 
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instance can only interfere if the lower instance, say autonomous pillarized parts, fails to 
fulfil their tasks. Individual responsibility to God, on the other hand, is a core idea at the 
Protestant thinking and so unlike Catholic churches there is no such hierarchical body in 
Protestant churches. On this ground, Protestants introduced the idea of sovereignty in 
their own circles. Accordingly, living community, school, family, church or companies 
are counted as circles and people should be sovereign in their own circles. That is to say 
there should not be any state interference.185 Nevertheless, as Walter Kickert stated 
“Dutch ‘pillarized’ society governed itself through political, social, economic and 
cultural institutions”, but after the growth of central and welfare state in the post-war 
period, the pillarized system had been challenged. 186
In this context, since the 1960s, the Netherlands is in the depillarization process in 
terms of the worldview of its citizens. However, its organizational pillarization still 
continues. Indeed, there are still Roman-Catholic and Protestant broadcasting 
corporations, hospitals or universities. Besides, the state financed Muslim or neutral 
schools continue to be opened while the Christian employers’ organization, Protestant 
workers’ union, Christian Democratic Center Party or a socialist broadcasting 
corporation still keep their existence. From this perspective, the Dutch society looks less 
depillarized. Nevertheless, the majority of Dutch citizens no longer adhere to religious 
doctrines and norms and are not members of a church. So, the ideological contents of 
the pillarized organizations became very vague. In other words, there are no clear cut 
distinguishing ideological values and norms of a, say, Catholic University any more. 
However, there is no direct connection in between depillarization and 
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dechristianization. Accordingly, Catholic priest or Protestant ministers supervised the 
pillarized organizations before the 1960s but their churches did not totally engage into 
the pillars they supported. Therefore, rapid secularization and dechristianization after 
the 1960s did not automatically interrupt the pillar system. As Anton C. Zijderveld 
stated, “people may well leave the church but can at the same time maintain all sorts of 
religious notions which they are willing to share with pillarized organizations, as long 
as their values and norms remain vague, general and thus ‘modern’.” Thus, although 
there is an ideological depillarization process in the Netherlands after the 1960s, it is 
still a pillarized society in terms of organizations. In that sense, secularization and 
dechristianization does not directly mean depillarization.187  
In addition, despite there are no grand coalitions including all major parties 
anymore, Dutch coalitional governments still include several parties. In this context, 
The Netherlands still maintains consociational democracy in its political life.188 Indeed, 
although depillarization and political antagonism between parties has increased since 
the 1960s, according to Lijphart, the politics of accommodation is still determinant in 
the Netherlands.189  
The pillar system and consociational democracy model were both the results of 
the societal fragmentation in the Netherlands. Consociational democracy was born to 
explain the reasons of stable democracy in the plural societies. Accordingly, the elites of 
socially fragmented bodies of society felt themselves forced to cooperate in order to 
cohabitate in peace. The proportional representation and coalitional governments in the 
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Dutch political life were clear results of this cooperation. Concerning Catholics and 
Protestants but later Socialist and the Liberals cleavage, the pillar system, on the other 
hand, had emerged to provide unity and peace in the Dutch society. Accordingly, 
diversities of these groups were moved from public to the private sphere by the state 
and they were allowed to act in their own circles. Thus, consociational democracy and 
the pillar system in Dutch history respectively made consensus rather than conflict and 
toleration rather than antagonism determinant both in political and in social life of the 
Netherlands: 
      The Dutch experience of pillarization may in that case be more than a curious 
configuration of a specific national past. It may function as a kind of model for societies 
that try to combine pluralism and democracy within a cultural context that is based upon 
and maybe even in the grip of many tensions and conflicts, yet in the end remains always 
geared towards consensus and cooperation. Not because of some sort of liberal open-
mindedness and longing for an easy-going harmony, but because there is no other way to 
survive collectively.190         
 
According to Knippenberg, the pillarization of Dutch society can be considered as 
a reaction to the unitary nation-building process of the Netherlands.191 Indeed, when the 
religious groups were marginalized from the public sphere, Protestant and Catholic self-
consciousness in their own communities had been strengthened. So, these confessional 
communities asked to the state for more autonomy. For that reason, two grand religious 
groups, Protestants and Catholics, especially struggled for education freedom. They 
were also opposing the new Dutch state penetrating all social and political area of the 
Dutch people. So, with the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, first the 
confessional groups but later the political groups, Socialist and Liberals, of the 
Netherlands gained their autonomy toward the State. As it was mentioned before, since 
the Dutch society was socially fragmented and so the clash among the religious groups 
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and social classes were so severe, political and religious leaders saw no way other than 
cooperation to maintain peace in the Dutch society. Therefore, they preferred 
cooperation. Lijphart names this policy as consociational democracy. In this context, 
cooperation was compulsory in the Netherlands to cohabitate with different subcultures. 
This situation, in turn, created a liberal culture that enabled respect and toleration 
toward different groups in the Netherlands. In other words, it is also possible to find 
liberal nationalist ties in the Dutch society. Accordingly, nationalism in this country 
seems more pluralistic and less ethnocentric precisely because the subcultures are 
respected and the plurality of these cultures is protected especially through given 
autonomies. This, in the end, provides minorities an opportunity to live together with 
the majority.  
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Chapter V 
 
 
A Dutch Exceptionalism? 
 
It was discussed in the last two chapters that thanks to the Napoleonic French 
invasion of the Netherlands after the French Revolution, the new Kingdom of the 
Netherlands had been founded on equal citizenship principal just after the French 
withdrawal. In that sense, civic rather than ethnic nationalism became salient in the 
Dutch society. On the other hand, it was also discussed that thanks to the pillarization of 
the society, a liberal tradition towards different cultures also became evident in the 
Netherlands.  
At this point, although Dutch population is quite xenophobic in public opinion 
polls, what is found is that it is this liberal and civic nationalist tendency that shaped the 
immigration policy of the country on more integrative rather than on assimilative bases. 
Besides, it was also found that it is this liberal and civic nationalist tradition that 
weakened the extreme right in the country. 
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 1) The Reasons of Integrative Immigration Policy     
 
As it was noted above, the main distinguishing feature of consociational 
democracy was cooperation rather than conflict and a good example of cooperation in 
Dutch society was proportional representation system that opened the doors for 
coalitional governments. Therefore, coalition governments are current means of 
consociational democracy. In that sense, according to Paul Pennings, thanks to the 
consociational democracy derived from pillarization, political parties in the Netherlands 
have to compromise rather than to simply respond their voter priorities. In other words, 
cabinet parties must overcome their differences to provide cooperation in coalition 
governments. Consequently, discourse of political parties during elections may change 
when they enter into the coalition government.192 Indeed, although anti-Islamic 
discourse of the LPF was clear during elections, this did not negatively affect, say, 
immigration policy of the country when the LPF became coalition partner. 
On the other hand, voluntary associations of free citizens set up to pursue a 
common goal and interest is generally called civic community. In that sense, civic 
community building in the Netherlands accelerated in the twentieth century. 
Accordingly, thanks to the pillarization and the Dutch state support, each confessional 
group gained the possibility to form voluntary associations of their own denomination. 
Catholic and Protestant trade unions, universities, media, sports clubs or hospitals can 
be counted as an example here. Furthermore, civic community building also began to be 
applied to the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. As a result, an integrative 
immigration policy had emerged in the country. In this context, the maintenance of 
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ethnic cultures was not only tolerated but also promoted by the Dutch state. The state 
also subsidized ethnic organizations.  
According to Paul Statham and Ruud Koopmans, on the other hand, due to the 
fact that Christian and Protestant confessional groups had their own state-sponsored 
autonomous organizations in education, health, or media, “…such rights could not be 
denied to the new cultural and religious minorities.”193 Nevertheless, these were not 
done for a democratic impulse. The real intention was to provide living in peace with 
different cultures. Indeed, according to Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, “[t]he 
development of ethnic communities was at least partly an unintended result of political 
opportunity structures (pillarization) and government policies that prevailed in [t]he 
Netherlands...”194 (italics added).    
Besides, it was emphasized that thanks to the pillarization and consociational 
democracy, proportional representation system that favors the representation of 
minority groups became salient in Dutch politics. Therefore, according to David C. 
Earnest, states with proportional representation system are expected to enfranchise 
resident aliens. In this context, this system “...may create electoral incentives for parties 
to enfranchise societal groups who may favor one party or another.”195 Indeed, all 
mainstream political parties supported the 1985 bill to enfranchise foreigners at the 
local elections and thus the Netherlands is today one of the few countries where resident 
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aliens have a right to vote at the local elections. In addition, they are also proportionally 
represented in the local councils.196
On the other hand, incorporation of foreigners into Dutch society is also shaped 
by the civic nationalist tradition in the country. As it was mentioned before, Dutch 
nation became a voluntary association and a citizens community with equal rights and 
duties in nineteenth century. In that sense, according to Earnest, “[t]he Netherlands’ 
decision to enfranchise resident aliens is particularly illustrative of this shared 
conception of Dutch citizenship.”197
In addition, as Paul Statham and Ruud Koopmans explained, civic definition of 
nation has made gaining access to formal civic rights relatively easy for migrants.198 
Indeed, after five years of legal residence, a non-Dutch citizen can obtain Dutch 
citizenship without renouncing his/her foreign nationality. 
In this context, it is clear that the integrative immigration policy of the 
Netherlands had been shaped by the pillar system and civic nationalist tradition in the 
country. In other words, it is this pillarization and civic nationalism that forced political 
parties to cooperate and overcome their differences in favor of foreigners, that granted 
state subsidies to ethnic and religious voluntary associations, that enfranchised resident 
aliens or that facilitated gaining access to formal civic rights. 
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 2) The Reasons of Weak Extreme Right 
 
According to the literature, two main conditions determine the extreme right 
votes. One is the protest votes and the other is xenophobia.199 The former condition 
states that a large resentment against the living conditions, political system, politicians 
or parties orient voters to vote for another party which is less responsible for the 
resentment. In other words, once people’s confidence with the system decreases, their 
votes for extreme right is more likely to increase.200 In this sense, when the protest votes 
are oriented to the extreme right party, it increases its turnouts.  
However, if public opinion polls are examined it is seen that the Dutch are 
relatively more satisfied with their life than the other countries in Europe.201 Indeed, 
eurobarometer surveys show that the great part of the Dutch people are satisfied with 
their life and feel no non-confidence about the future. That is to say protest votes theory 
is not so strong in the Dutch case. Nonetheless, as it was discussed above, protest votes 
were indeed the determining factor in the LPF’s electoral success.  
Besides, the second condition states that the main breeding-ground of extreme 
right parties is xenophobia.202 So, following this statement, one can argue that extreme 
right in the Netherlands had limited success simply because xenophobic sentiments in 
the country had limited spread. However, as it was discussed above, substantial part of 
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the Dutch society gives xenophobic answers to the survey questions. But then why 
extreme right parties are weak in the Netherlands? 
According to Mudde and Van Holsteyn, the answer of this question can be found 
in internal factors. Since the extreme right parties in the Netherlands are all badly 
organized, lacking large member networks and cadres and are always plagued by 
scandals, they have limited success in the Dutch political life.203  
However, according to some scholars, the real reason stems from Dutch history. 
Accordingly, political and socio-cultural life shaped by pillarization and civic 
nationalist tradition does not allow extremisms in the society. In this context, according 
to Paul Lucardie, one should look at the history of the Netherlands to explain the 
relative failure of extreme right-wing parties in this country. In that sense, since the 
Dutch nation derives from civic rather than ethnic nationalism, ethnic nationalist 
discourse had difficulty in finding supporters among the Dutch people. In that sense, 
absence of a nationalist tradition in the country is one of the reasons for the failure of 
them. In this context, since civic nationalism defines the nation as a voluntary 
association, it is more likely in a civic nationalist society to tolerate different ethnic 
groups and immigrants. However, since ethnic nationalism defines the nation on the 
base of blood, “we” and “they” dichotomy is clearer than civic nationalism. In that 
sense, foreign cultures are perceived as pitfall to the detriment of common blood. That 
means that it is more likely in an ethnic nationalist society to contribute xenophobia.204 
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Indeed, according to Piero Ignazi, “[t]he more ethnic nationalist... people are, the more 
they vote extreme right.”205   
On the other hand, as it was explained before, due to the fact that religious 
differences among the people in the Netherlands were so vigorous, they pragmatically 
developed the system of pillarization to naturalize these differences and to leave in 
peace in the country. In that sense, certain autonomies were given to each pillar to 
perpetuate their cultural presence in peace. In other words, tolerance to different 
cultures which is essential for the perpetuation of Dutch society became salient in the 
country. Indeed, thanks to the pillarization, each confessional group was able to form 
voluntary associations of their own denomination in the Netherlands. Although the real 
intention was to provide living in peace with different cultures, this in the end caused a 
tolerance and liberal tendency towards different cultures in the country. For that reason, 
any attempt to harm this tolerance faces with an aggressive response simply because it 
is perceived as a threat against the presence of society. In that sense, according to 
Lucardie, a repressive sanction against extreme right parties by Dutch institutions and 
people is another reason for the failure of these parties.206 At this point, Ignazi agrees 
with Lucardie: “…probably in no other country has the counter-mobilization against the 
extreme right proved so vigorous as in the Netherlands, both on the streets and inside 
the institutions.”207
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Indeed, many Dutch people perceive extreme right parties as a threat to Dutch 
liberalism and struggle to eliminate them.208 They put their pressures on the leaders and 
members or on the voters of the parties. As a tactic of isolation, for example, they do 
not involve or engage the representatives of extreme right parties in a debate. Indeed, 
especially during election campaigns, Dutch media in general does not include their 
representatives in the screens or in the columns. Other ways of struggle are disturbing 
extreme right party meetings, holding counter-demonstrations, or even engaging 
physical violence against objects such as party posters. By this way, supporters of these 
parties are discouraged to become a party member or to join a party meeting. Indeed, 
although many party members pay their dues, they are almost totally inactive in party 
politics precisely because of fear of societal pressure.209
Dutch institutions also took a prominent role in the struggle against the extreme-
right. In that sense, various administrative measures are used to block these parties. As 
Van Holsteyn explained, “...the requirements for obtaining signatures in order to obtain 
access to the ballot were changed to make participation by the extreme-right parties 
more difficult.”210 Dutch courts, on the other hand, carefully scrutinize extreme right 
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parties’ or persons’ comments or discourses, and if necessary, they do not avoid 
punishing them.211  
It has been seen that xenophobia and protest votes theory in determining extreme 
right votes does not fully work in the Dutch case. In this context, although it might be 
true that certain internal factors such as bad party organizations and low cadres 
somehow weaken extreme right in the country, it is clear that the main reason of the 
failure of extreme right in the Netherlands stems once again from the pillar system and 
civic nationalist tradition. Accordingly, since the country comes from a civic nationalist 
tradition, ethnic nationalist discourse of these parties had difficulty in finding supporters 
among the Dutch people. Besides, thanks to the pillar system, tolerance to different 
cultures which is essential to live in peace among these diversities in the country 
became salient in the Dutch society. Therefore, any attempt to harm this tolerance faces 
with an aggressive response by Dutch institutions or people. 
In that sense, although the Netherlands harbors integrative immigration policy and 
has weak extreme right, the considerable numbers of population are as xenophobic as 
European average in the public opinion polls. However, since the pillar system and civic 
nationalist tradition shape immigration policy and extreme right in the country, this 
xenophobia does not turn into, say, assimilation in the immigration policy or it does not 
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contribute to the extreme right votes in the elections. In other words, the pillar system 
and civic nationalist tradition blocks certain extremisms in the country. 
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Conclusion 
      
 It is argued in classical political science that policy outputs are fed by public 
preferences (inputs). It is also argued that these inputs more resonate in Western 
democracies. For that reason, policy outputs in democratic countries are expected to 
reflect public preferences. At this point, it is important to know how to measure and 
how to reach these preferences and clear result of this process is public opinion polls. In 
that sense, it is discussed that in spite of the fact that the credibility of public opinion 
polls is a bit controversial, they still measure and reflect public preferences. In this 
context, according to the eurobarometer survey results, although Dutch people are as 
xenophobic as European average, these xenophobic sentiments that constitute public 
inputs do not turn into policy outputs in the Netherlands. Therefore, in the Dutch case, 
policy outputs and public inputs differ from each other.   
Indeed, integrative immigration policy and weaker extreme right party tradition 
are clear proof of this situation in the country. In this context, it was found that the 
Netherlands still preferred integration rather than assimilation and extreme right parties 
were not capable to make any significant impact on elections.  
However, why classical input-output correlation does not work in the 
Netherlands? According to the findings of this study, civic nationalism and the pillar 
system prevent public inputs in transforming into policy outputs. In that sense, 
sociological and historical backgrounds of the country have been examined and it was 
seen that civic nationalism and the pillar system were two by products of religious 
demarcation in the Netherlands. In this context, what were the premises of the creation 
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of Dutch nationalism? Accordingly, thanks to French invasion and spread of French 
Revolution principles like popular sovereignty, historical Catholic-Protestant cleavage 
forced the country to adopt civic nationalism which would provide undivided Christian 
nation on the ground of shared citizenship concept. Confessional segmentation of the 
country, pillarization, on the other hand, enabled the creation of liberal tendency 
towards different cultures in the Netherlands. 
Nonetheless, although the Netherlands have long succeeded to cohabitate in 
peace, it is still possible to find certain xenophobic sentiments in the country. Indeed, 
according to public opinion polls, Dutch people are as xenophobic as European average. 
In that sense, if the democratic political system is a means to transform the public inputs 
into policy outputs and if xenophobia really feeds extreme right, it is expected that 
restrictive immigration policy and strong extreme right parties resonate in the 
Netherlands. However, what the study shows is that although considerable numbers of 
Dutch people are xenophobic, the country has still integrative immigration policy and 
has weak extreme right parties precisely because civic definition of nation and the 
pillarization of society block certain extremisms in the country. 
Indeed, the study showed that since the immigration policy was shaped by the 
pillar system and civic nationalist tradition and since they also affected extreme right 
politics in the country, Dutch xenophobia did not dramatically transform integrative 
immigration policy into a restrictive policy or it did not contribute to extreme right 
votes. In that sense, the pillarization of society and the definition of nation on more 
civic terms blocked certain extremisms in the country. 
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